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1. Introduction 
 
How does the dynamic between religion and politics affect notions towards ethnic identities? 
How are ideas of “us” and “them” or inclusion and exclusion expressed? And what constitutes 
such ideas or attitudes? Identity is a vast category in which religious, political and ethnic 
labels play an important part. The aim of this thesis is to address that dynamic by focusing on 
how these concepts relate to one another. More specifically how the political arena is infused 
with both religion and ethnicity. While addressing the research questions, my objectives are to 
identify how leaders use religion and how statements can sustain division or exacerbate 
existing divisions for political benefits. I will analyse statements by politicians and other 
actors within the political discourse that illustrate how individuals or groups with different 
ethnic and religious labels describe one another. The data in this study is based on Nigerian 
newspapers and I will implement discourse analysis as my methodological tool for analysing 
these. Trough discourse analysis I examine how Nigerians’ attitudes towards one another are 
played out and deepened by various actors in the political discourse. My main focus is on the 
period around the Nigerian Presidential election, 16
th
 of April 2011.  
 
The aim for this chapter is to demonstrate why my research objectives are important and offer 
a background for these. To begin with I will underline the importance of my research 
objectives by referring to the contemporary Nigerian context. Next I will offer relevant 
academic literature on the topic which serves as background information. The background 
information moreover underlines the relevance and importance of my case study and research 
objectives. After the background section I state my motivation followed by a more detailed 
account of the research objectives and what methods I implement to address them.  An outline 
of the thesis and its chapters is offered in the last section of this chapter. 
 
 
1.1 Context 
Since I embarked on this academic journey there have been many sad events reported in the 
media concerning the religious and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. The most conspicuous event 
was perhaps the bomb blasts on Christmas Day aimed at Christian churches. It thus appears 
that Nigeria is trapped in a religious crisis. The situation in Nigeria is, nevertheless, far more 
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complex than that. The role of religion and ethnicity in Nigerian politics and in national and 
local conflicts are important issues of growing concern, but contemporary Nigerian politics 
cannot be understood without emphasising the role of ethnicity. (Kastfelt 1997; Rudolph 
2006;Vaughan 2001). Attitudes to race and identity contribute to shape social reality. 
Xenophopia or fear of the “other” can lead to social instability. The situation in Nigeria is 
quite complex as religion, ethnicity, and politics are all intertwined, leaving the country with a 
highly explosive mix. Nigeria has often been called a “stumbling giant”. Being the most 
populous and among the most influential economies, but also among the highly unstable 
countries in Africa, it makes an interesting study.   
Following the presidential election in Nigeria, there were violent riots in reaction to what the 
losing side saw as a rigged election. International observers have, however, approved of the 
election (BBC: 2012). The background for the violent reaction lies in the tradition of the 
elections, whereby Christian and Muslim leaders are to be elected every second term. Prior to 
this year's election the sitting president of the PDP (People Democratic Party), Umaru 
Yar'Adua fell ill before his time was up. The vice-president Goodluck Jonathan therefore 
stepped into office temporarily while awaiting Yar'Adua's recovery. As Yar’ Adua was 
rendered a candidate of the “Muslim population” and Jonathan a candidate of the “Christian 
population” there was quite a lot of stark reactions when Jonathan stepped into office. 
National and International media (Human Rights Watch, Guardian, Daily Trust) reported 
about rivals of the incumbent president who targeted specific ethnic or religious groups 
(Reuters: 2011; Human Rights Watch 2011; Ahmad 2011). Inter-faith conflicts are common 
and some would claim that politicians also make use of the existing divide for the sake of 
their own political agenda (Nnoli 2008). 
 
 
 
1.2 Background & Previous Research 
 Nigeria is often referred to as a “stumbling giant”(Bøås 2011) and especially Northern Nigeria 
has suffered a lot in terms of ethnic and religiously motivated riots and killings. Scholars such 
as Mwadkwon and Sodiq describe the current situation as an on-going conflict played out 
predominantly by Muslims (predominantly Hausa-Fulani, but also Yoruba) v. Christians 
(various groups -mainly Igbo, but also Yoruba). Furthermore internal conflicts within groups 
and conflicts between nomadic- and non-nomadic groups are also common (Simon Davou 
Mwadkwon 2001: 57; Sodiq 2009). Most of the killings take place in the so-called Middle-
8 
 
belt or in the Northern states of Nigeria, but hostile attitudes among Nigerians towards other 
Nigerians of different belonging are widespread. The civil war that lasted from 1967-1970 is 
over, but many Nigerians still fall victim to the old divide. During the Civil War Nigerians in 
the South who were predominantly Christian wanted to break out from “Nigeria” to form their 
own country called “Biafra”. In terms of “nationalism” there are therefore different pledges of 
allegiance. Some Nigerians opts for the separation or break-up of Nigeria and among them are 
the “Biafrans” who pledge allegiance to Biafra. Then there are Nigerians from both North and 
South who support the current Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lastly and most recently the 
fundamentalist group Boko Haram advocating for a Nigeria based on Islam and Sharia, whose 
name mean something like ‘Western education is forbidden’(Bargery dictionary). 
Niels Kastfelt (2003) sees religion and politics as intertwined and overlapping. He claims this 
based on the observation that during the 1980s and 1990s both national and local Nigerian 
politics was infused with religious matters. He further claims that antagonisms between 
Christian and Muslim communities have even at times threatened the very existence of the 
Nigerian state. Political competition has often been defined as an opposition between a 
predominantly “Muslim north” and a predominantly “Christian south”.  At the local level, 
however, ethnic and religious loyalties converge as communities define themselves in ethno-
religious terms. In the North, for example the Hausa ethnic group identify themselves as 
Muslim (Kastfelt 2003: 203). 
 
 
1.3 Rationale and Research objectives 
Quite a lot has been written on the Nigerian situation, about the conflict in the North and 
about the conflicts in the South, in the oil-rich Niger-Delta region (Ukiwo 2005; Ojo 2002; 
Ake 1996). Scholars have also written about the problem of ethnicity and of socio-economic 
differences (Mwadkwon 2001; Nnoli 1998; Egwu 1998). Not so many studies have, however, 
focused on the dynamic of religion and politics in contemporary Nigeria without either over-
emphasising the North as a problem area or without over-emphasising the role of politicians. I 
suggest that my study offers something different to the research community. My contribution 
is different as I focus on various Nigerian actors' attitudes rather than actions towards both 
religious and ethnic identities.  I also address how such attitudes may contribute to the 
dynamic of religion, politics and ethnicity in terms of strengthening or weakening tensions 
related to ethnocentrism. This thesis is based on a case study of the dynamic of religion, 
politics and ethnic identity in Nigeria. I may therefore not be able to come to sweeping 
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generalisations to be implemented outside this case, nevertheless, it is my aim to offer an 
alternative perspective to existing approaches and theories in the academic field regarding 
ethnicity in Nigeria. The contribution of this thesis to the wider academic field will be 
discussed more extensively in chapters 6 and 7. My aim for this thesis is therefore to 
investigate the dynamic of religion, politics, and identity in order to develop existing 
knowledge as to how these concepts relate to one another. As mentioned initially my research 
questions deals with how the above-mentioned dynamic affect and influence notions towards 
ethnic identities and furthermore how ideas of inclusion and exclusion are expressed. By 
searching for statements by politicians and commoners, my objective is to identify how 
leaders play on religion and to examine how statements can sustain division or play on 
already existing divisions for political benefits. I furthermore seek to expand on how Nigerian 
attitudes towards one another are played out and played upon by various actors of different 
ethnic and religious “belonging”. My case study is concerned with how such attitudes were 
manifest in the Nigerian Presidential election 2011. More details on the methods for the case 
study will be presented shortly. 
 
 
1.4 Methods 
I have chosen to do a case study on the dynamic of religion, politics, and identity in Nigeria 
Within the case I have furthermore decided to focus on attitudes towards identity expressed by 
various actors in the political discourse revolving around the Nigerian Presidential election 
2011. My aim is to find out how politicians and others make use of existing divides. Identity 
is perhaps one of the most important and complex concepts in this thesis and in the case of 
Nigeria ethnic- and religious identities are at times intertwined. The term “ethnicity” can thus 
refer to both identities. My analysis is based on data from a time span of one month in which I 
have especially emphasised the weeks and days before and after the event of the presidential 
election. The case study is a means for my analysis of the research question in which I apply 
the methodological tool of discourse analysis.  By analysing news articles from one 
geographically “Northern” based – and one “Southern” based newspaper I aim to explore 
Nigerian ideas of and attitudes towards themselves and other Nigerians, more specifically 
ideas of “us” and “them” or inclusion and exclusion. By looking at one “Southern” and one 
“Northern” newspaper, I hope that this will enable me to get more insight into ruling attitudes 
towards identities, “us” and “them”. More detailed information concerning research methods 
will follow in the Methods chapter. 
10 
 
 
 
1.5 Chapter Overviews 
After this introduction, I will in chapter 2, be dealing with relevant literature on ethnicity and 
on religious and ethnic identities. The focus will be on the political aspects of ethnicity while 
critically assessing the academic approaches applied by scholars writing within the field of 
topic. The concept of ethnicity and its political aspects are scientific tools to be used in the 
main analysis. In chapter 3 I will give more detailed information on what method I have 
chosen why I have chosen it and how I will go about my analysis. Chapter 3 will also deal 
with researcher issues related to data collection such as reflexivity, transparency, and similar 
aspects. The fourth chapter presents the data and my typology of it followed by an analysis of 
the data collection in chapter 5. Having introduced the data properly I shall analyse it by using 
the analytical tool of discourse analysis, outlined in chapter 3. Succeeding the main analysis, a 
discussion of the findings will summarise the thesis in chapter 6, before I conclude in the last 
and seventh chapter. 
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2. Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
'How does the dynamic of religion and politics affect and influence notions towards ethnic 
identities? How are ideas of “us” and “them” of inclusion and exclusion expressed?' These are 
some of the questions I asked in the 'Introduction' chapter. In this chapter I aim to explore the 
existing theories on the topic and how other scholars have addressed similar questions. 
Religion, politics, ethnic identities or ethnicity are all very wide and slippery concepts. I have 
therefore chosen to limit myself to discussing the literature on ethnicity in Nigeria. In terms of 
“ethnicity” as identity marker, I regard it in the case of Nigeria to contain both ethnic- and 
religious identities. In the next paragraph I will address and discuss why I have chosen to treat 
the two types of identities together.  Second I give a brief historical outline of the study on 
ethnicity in Nigeria and an overview of the most common perspectives adopted by scholars. 
Third, I go to the issue of ethnopolitics and present different arguments concerning the nature 
and functions of ethnicity with regards to federalism, nationalism, regionalism, and 
democracy. Fourth, I will engage in a critical discussion of the arguments. Finally, I present a 
conclusion in which I point to the potential for implementing and improving existing theories 
and arguments on ethnopolitics and instrumentalism. 
  
 
2.2 Ethno-religious identities 
According to Scarrit (2005), it is useful to separate religious identities from other identities 
because not all ethnic identities are ethnopolitical, that is, politically relevant or politicized 
(Scarritt 2005: 75). On the other hand religion is often an important basis for ethnic identity 
(Haynes 2005: 92) and ethnicity can serve as a platform where socio-political variables like 
religion, gender, class, and region are expressed (Vaughan 2001: 79). Nnoli argues that the 
dynamic nature of ethnicity is its most salient feature. Ethnicity does not 'exist in a pure form', 
but is always ‘closely associated with political, juridical, religious, and other social views' 
(Okwudiba Nnoli 2008: 13). This case study revolves around the dynamic of religion, politics, 
and identity, and is therefore preoccupied with the relationship of political and ethnic aspects 
of religion and political aspects of ethnicity. In the Nigerian context the political aspect of 
ethnicity and religion coincides. Both ethnicity and religion are often mobilised for political 
purposes which again is related to how identity is perceived. The political mobilisation is 
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based on how different religious and political groups view their own - and each other’s 
groups. For the purpose of this case study I therefore   choose to treat religious and ethnic 
identities together as both can be seen as groups with identity claims.  For the purpose of this 
case study I also see it as useful for me to engage with the wider academic literature on 
ethnicity in Nigeria. Within the theoretical discussion for this case study, all arguments made 
for ethnic groups are relevant for religious as well. With regards to the overall aims of this 
thesis, nothing is therefore “lost” by treating all “groups with identity claims” as theoretically 
equivalent to “ethnicity”. 
 
Kastfelt (1997) list two types of religious and political conflict in which one is on the national 
political level and the other on the regional or local level. According to him, a lot of tension 
can be derived from a particular part of the Nigerian constitution that implies that Nigeria is a 
secular state and that there should be no state religion. In the related debate Muslims generally 
opt for no separation seeing it a purely Western, and thus also Christian product. The 
Christians, however, see religion as belonging to the private sphere, outside the state 
legislation. Kastfelt argue that the different views on the relationship between state and 
religion have been manifested in concrete controversies such as that of the introduction of 
Sharia law, Nigeria's membership in the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference) (Kastfelt 
1997: 44). In terms of conflicts on the regional and local level the so-called Middle Belt of 
Northern Nigeria has long been a “hot spot” where Kastfelt argue that political conflicts are 
connected with ethnic and religious identities. The dominant group in the North is the Hausa-
Fulani who are predominantly Muslim and who have been strongly opposed to the Christian 
minority groups in the southern parts of the North and in the Middle Belt. The Christian 
minority tend to belong to minority ethnic groups who have become Christians of recent date, 
during the 20
th
 century. The attempt to convert these groups to Islam in the 19
th
 century was 
less successful and as Christianity expanded so did bitterness between the two religions and 
between the ethnic groups. For the Christians religion became a 'defining element in ethnic-
identities and thus a religion of resistance against Fulani and Muslim hegemony' (Kastfelt 
1997: 46). In the case of Nigeria we can thus conclude that the assumption of ethnic and 
religious identities coinciding is valid for our study and we shall therefore move on to 
theoretical perspectives relating to the study ethnicity in Nigeria, while focusing on the 
political aspects of it. 
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2.3 Ethnicity and ethnic identity in Nigeria 
The study of “ethnicity” can be traced back to the colonial era only that those studies were 
limited to “tribe”, which is far narrower than the “ethnicity” being studied today. In post-
colonial times, at the eve of independence, “modernity” was the new intellectual paradigm 
which included the proliferation of nationalism and nation-building. There were no room for 
studies on ethnicity during this paradigm as ethnicity was seen as a threat to the unity of the 
nation-state, or the federal state. A reason for this might be the views of ethnicity at that time 
as inherently conflictual. A new popular trend among scholars in the 60's was to view 
ethnicity as an instrument of the elite, or even by the state, thus referred to as institutionalism 
(Ukiwo 2005: 5). The history of the study on ethnicity in Nigeria is coloured by conflict and 
there is a strong tendency of focusing on the history of the concept while concluding that the 
elite in continuation of the colonial administration is using ethnicity in order to “divide and 
rule”. An instrumentalist and institutionalist approach are among the most common while 
criticizing the primordial approach associating it with exotic descriptions of “tribes” from the 
colonial era. The word “tribe” is however, still used by scholars on ethnicity in Nigeria, with 
reference to “tribalism”. 
 
Varshney (2002) distinguishes four schools of thought: essentialism, instrumentalism, 
constructivism and institutionalism. Scholars do however rely on more than one school of 
thought in their analyses. Ukiwo (2005) has given a brief summary of the schools: 
Essentialism can be seen as a continuation of primordialism a tradition in which ethnicity is 
viewed as static. Essentialism restates this by linking ethnic identity to the past and to cultural 
differences among groups. Instrumentalism  
 
'posits that ambitious classes manipulate dormant ethnic identities to pursue their interests, 
thereby politicising ethnicity and ethnicising the polity. Constructivists interrogate the origins 
of ethnic groups, tracing identity 'construction' or 'invention' to the activities of colonial 
authorities, missionaries and emergent nationalists and emphasising the historicity and fluidity 
of ethnic identities. Institutionalists emphasize the critical role of political institutions and 
pragmatic policies in the framing of ethnic relations' (Ukiwo 2005: 5). 
 
Scholars on ethnicity in Nigeria tend to write from an instrumentalist, institutionalist, and 
constructivist perspective while emphasising the dynamic rather than the static definition of 
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the concept (Udogu 2001: 16). Okwudiba Nnoli (2008) state that ‘ethnicity does not exist in a 
pure form. It is always closely associated with political, juridicial, religious and other social 
views’ (Nnoli 1978, 2008: 13). Vaughan (2001) describes ethnicity as a platform in which 
important socio-political variables may be expressed (2001: 79). The overarching theme 
which most scholars address from one angle or another is that of ethnopolitics.  Among the 
scholars on ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Nigeria, Nnoli is perhaps the most cited scholar 
and he mentions these four characteristics of ethnicity: 
 
1) It is a social phenomenon associated with interactions among members of different  
ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by the communal  
character of their boundaries. The relevant communal factor may be language, culture,  
or both. In Africa, language has clearly been the most crucial variable. As social  
formation, however, ethnic groups are not necessarily homogeneous entities even  
linguistically and culturally... 
 
2) Much more than ethnocentrism, ethnicity is characterized by a common consciousness  
of being one in relation to the other relevant ethnic groups. This factor more than any 
other defines the boundary of the group that is relevant for understanding ethnicity at 
any historical point in time.. 
 
3)  Exclusiveness is an attribute of ethnicity. In-group - out-group boundaries emerge  
with it  and, in time, become marked, more distinct than before, and jealously guarded 
by the various ethnic groups... 
 
4)  Conflict is an important aspect of ethnicity. This is inevitable under conditions of inter-
 ethnic competition for scarce valuable resources, particularly in societies where 
inequality is accepted as natural, and wealth is greatly esteemed (Nnoli 1980: 5-8, 
Udogu 2001: 15). 
 
Nnoli (1980) does not specifically refer to “religious” groups in his four characteristics of 
ethnicity. He has however, stated (1978, 2008) that ethnicity is always ‘closely associated 
with political, juridicial, religious and other social views’ (Nnoli 1978, 2008: 13). As 
mentioned initially under the heading “Ethno-religious identities”, both religious- and ethnic 
groups can make claims to identity and can mobilised for political purposes. These claims to 
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identity is what Nnoli here refers to as an attribute of “exclusiveness” which again serves to 
define boundaries between “in-” and “out-groups”, in other words how groups perceive 
themselves and each other.  In Kastfelt’s example Christian religion became a ‘defining 
element in ethnic identities’ as resistance against Muslim and Hausa-Fulani domination 
(Kastfelt 1997:46, p.10 of this chapter). Religious identity and religious groups are therefore 
in similarity with ethnic groups exclusive. Religious groups can also in my view be regarded 
“ethnic” as in the case of Nigeria where both religious- and ethnic communal factors such as 
language and/or culture coincide. An example of this is the debate concerning the Nigerian 
constitution as pointed out by Kastfelt (1997: 44, p.10 this chapter). The exclusiveness may 
further lead to a desire to dominate or subsume other groups which again can spark conflict, 
but also strengthen claims to identity. Such claims to identity can further be utilised for 
obtaining and securing political interests of the group by engaging in what scholars refer to as 
“ethnopolitics”. 
 
 
2.4 Ethnopolitics 
Ethnopolitics is centred on the idea of a dynamic and instrumental relationship between 
politics and ethnicity. The less scientific word for it is “tribalism” and according to Nnoli 
 
'It is common to interpret African politics in tribal terms. Tribalism is perceived to be the 
central unifying concept for the analysis of African life. This perspective was first popularized 
by colonial anthropologists. It has been internalized to such an extent that even Africans 
themselves now think of the dynamics of their societies as being dominated by that 
phenomenon (…) It is often forgotten that the concepts that prevail in the academic 
community are not solely of an academic or scientific nature. They usually have an 
ideological and political character. This is particularly so with the concept of tribalism. In 
Africa the concept has a colonial origin. Its function was tied to the nature and purpose of 
colonialism. The financial oligarchies that ruled Europe in the nineteenth century organized 
production in the colonies to satisfy their need for profit and capital accumulation.' (Okwudiba 
Nnoli 2008: 1, my emphasis). 
 
Within the theme of ethnopolitics there are however some tension as to whether ethnopolitics 
or tribalism is purely negative or if it has some positive aspects as well. There are also 
tensions in terms of different interests between ethnic groups who are in and who are not in-
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power and also internal tension as to whether to serve one's own ethnic 'nation', or to serve the 
nation-state. A third tension is that of unity, whether ethnicity can be seen as a catalyst for 
unity or as an obstacle to it. 
 
 
2.4.1 Ethnopolitics and federalism 
In L. Adele Jinadu's work on “Ethnic Conflict and Federalism in Nigeria”, (2002), we can 
read that Nigerian federalism had been designed to 'pursue the objective of “diversity in 
unity” (King 1982: 20-21, Jinadu 2002: 1). Jinadu sees this objective as Nigeria's main 
problem as he asks the question “diversity in unity at what price?” . The strategy of using 
federalism to accommodate for ethnic diversity is challenged by ethnic mobilisation and the 
ethnic groups' perceived domination by other groups, and the exclusion of the “dominated” 
groups from national or 'unit-level' government level (Jinadu 2002: 2). As for the Janus-faced 
character of ethnicity, Jinadu points on one hand to the unifying aspect of ethnicity through its 
properties of accommodation, compromise, or cooperation, in terms of building coalitions 
across ethnic divides and the status of ethnic and sub-ethnic politicians as having a bridge-
building function 'across the ethnic divide' (Jinadu 2002: 5). He does however, questions how 
fit the current political 'architecture' is to accommodate for ethnic diversity within the 
Nigerian nation-state. He describes the current nation-state a flaw due to its 'partial or 
parochial and ideologized, unificationist, integrationist or assimilationist assumptions and 
thrust' (Jinadu 2002: 12). On the other hand Jinadu talk of ethnopolitics and federalism and 
how the emergence of self-defined ethnic and sub-ethnic groups have been 'propelled by self-
seeking and self-styled ethnic/sub-ethnic group political leaders who are seeking a niche for 
themselves in the country's enormous “apple pie”, to enable them to disburse patronage and to 
divert state resources to corruptly enrich themselves’ (Jinadu 2002: 6). In conclusion he points 
to 'timeless' theoretical and philosophical questions related to resurgent ethnicity as being 
about equality, fairness, freedom, national identity, justice, liberty, needs, political 
representation, and the relationship between political obligation and ethno-communal and 
similar obligation (Jinadu 2002: 12, Kymlicka and Norman 2000, Parekh 1998: 509-510).  
Jinadu claim on one hand that ethnicity can be seen as a unifying factor while on the other he 
questions whether the government or the nation-state is able to handle the issue of ethnicity. 
Jinadu further point to how federalism can be a platform for “self-seeking” political leaders. 
Ethnicity can be mobilised for the sake of bridge-building and can thus be seen as having a 
unifying aspect. Nevertheless, he also describes the nation-state as partial and “unificationist”. 
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I can only assume that he refers to “unity” as an ethnopolitical tool through which politicians, 
whether local, national, or federal, can achieve creating a “niche for themselves”. Though 
“Unity” and ethnic identity are used by politicians for their own purposes it does not mean 
that the ethnic groups they represent does not benefit as well. Ethnicity can thus be seen as a 
potential instrument for mobilising ethnic solidarity which can be used to manipulate, but also 
to promote democratic aspirations. Rudolph (2006) argues in similarity with Jinadu that the 
government deliberately make use of existing ethnic tensions. 
 
 
2.4.2 Ethnoterrritorial politics 
Rudolph (2006) argues that the “ethnoterritorial” politics, playing the north against the south, 
was a divide-and-rule device by the regime who overthrew the Second Republic. The “Second 
Republic” refers to the second Nigerian democratic republic denoting civilian as opposed to 
military rule. After General Buhari’s military regime that overthrew the Second Republic, 
there were two more consecutive military regimes before the Third Republic resumed. Nigeria 
is currently in the era of the “Fourth Republic” which has lasted since 1999 (Falola & Heaton 
2008: 14, 209, 214).  
The “ethnoterritorial” politics during Buhari’s regime was founded on an already existing 
class struggle between the Northern Muslims and Christian Southerners living in the North 
who were educated and more affluent than their Northern brothers. Tensions were rooted in 
ethnic, religious, and developmental differences between the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo. 
(Rudolph, 2006: 186-192). Rudolph argue that the civil war or the Biafran war was the 
product of 'a combination of simmering ethnopolitical rivalries, political ambition, political 
corruption, good intentions, and finally, the disintegration of the military and the destruction 
of the bureaucracy as all-Nigeria institutions of unity' (Rudolph, 2006: 181). Ethnopolitics can 
thus be seen as mobilising along religious, ethnic, and regional lines. The mobilisation 
strengthens group boundaries as jealousy between groups is also strengthened by perceived 
inequalities. These arguments also help underline the dynamic nature and complexity of 
ethnicity given that regional or territorial identity also constitute a part of ethnic identity, 
ethnic tension, and ethnopolitics. Another term within ethnopolitics is that of 
“ethnonationalism” which has been addressed by Udogu (2001). 
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2.4.3 Ethnonationalism 
Udogu (2001), state that in post-colonial African states ethnic groups tend to increasingly turn 
to ethnonationalism as a result of alienation towards the state, and especially so for minority 
groups. Ethnic groups view the state to be the source of their sorrows and thus according to 
Udogu ‘irrelevant’ to their common interests (Udogu 2001: 21). There is also tension when it 
comes to loyalty on national v sub-national level as 'key actors or the hegemonic class who 
press for ethnic claims on the state are themselves major players at the national level' (Udogu 
2001: 21). Udogu thus raise the question as to whether such politicians are sincere in their 
devotion to their ethnic group or whether it is the sate they are devoted to. He concludes that 
'it has become increasingly clear that some professed subnationalists are prepared to pursue 
their noncentripetal objectives if doing that consigned to their collectivities the power and 
resources for the groups' survival – and the state may be 'damned' in the process' (Udogu 
1995: 3, 2001: 22). Instead of playing the detribalizing role previously ascribed to them 
political entrepreneurs often invoked ethnic solidarity for the sake of promoting their own 
interests (Udogu 2001: 22). To summarize, Udogu argues that in response to institutional or 
governmental ethnopolitics there is ethnopolitics on a more local political level in which 
ethnopolitics may constitute something positive for the ethnic group on a national scale. 
Udogu does question how sincere such politicians are, or in other words if they really are as 
pressing for minority rights for the sake of the minorities or for the sake of enriching 
themselves. Mobilisation of ethnic solidarity may thus be simultaneously positive and 
negative as it can promote democracy by pressing for ethnic claims, but also be regarded 
negative as those pressing for democratic rights also may be using it to promote their own 
interests. The issue of politicians mobilising ethnic solidarity and manipulate people for their 
own political and personal interests is an important dimension of ethnopolitics. 
 
 
2.4.4 Dimensions of ethnopolitics 
Olufemi Vaughan supports Udogu, and suggests that the 'persistent manipulations of ethno-
regional identities contributed significantly to a tragic civil war (1966-70)' which was 
followed by a reduction of Nigeria's 'diverse cultural communities to fortresses of political 
ethnicity' (Vaughan 2001: 79). Vaughan describes ethnicity as a platform where important 
sociopolitical variables are expressed. These variables include class, religion, gender, and 
region. Whereas ethnicity is a critical instrument for manipulating power by the ruling classes, 
Vaughan underline that ethnicity can as well be used to mobilise groups, in resistance to 
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oppressive and corrupt regimes (2001:79).  Vaughan therefore has a more positive and 
nuanced view on ethnicity, while seeing it as having a Janus-faced character. It can be used 
both for the purpose of accumulation and mobilisation, as an instrument and as a domain for 
mass resistance (Vaughan 2001: 80). Vaughan criticise the tendency within the instrumentalist 
perspective to dismiss ethnicity as 'mainly mediums in which the political class seek refuge 
behind communal themes and symbols' arguing that 'confronted with the rapid decay of the 
Nigeria state in the 1990s a new generation of civic leaders are reconstructing ethnic themes 
as the medium for the articulation of not only communal but democratic aspirations' (Vaughan 
2001: 80). While other scholars regard ethnicity as an obstacle for democracy, Vaughan sees it 
as a medium in which democratic notions can be expressed. In my opinion, ethnicity and 
ethnopolitics should be regarded both as an obstacle and a medium for democratic notions. 
Whether it is regarded an obstacle for – or as promoting democracy depends on who one asks 
and on that persons’ perception of “democracy”. Similarly ideas of what constitutes “unity” 
differ depending on which “team” or which position in society one is in. Different ideas of 
concepts like “unity” and “democracy” are something that will be addressed more detailed in 
the following paragraph, but also in ch.6.  
 
 
2.4.5 Ethnopolitics and democracy 
Mustapha (2004) argue that the politics of identity are central to the Nigerian democratization 
process. He views ethnic sectarianism, in terms of inter-ethnic processes as a real threat to 
Nigerian democracy and unity, but  argue that it would be one-sided not to also consider intra-
ethnic disagreements and confrontations (Mustapha 2004: 257). Mustapha claim that there is a 
connection between the state, hegemonism, xenophopia and democracy in Nigeria (2004: 
258). In his view there is no doubt that democracy has fanned inter-ethnic conflict. In terms of 
Intra-ethnic conflict he is critical of a monolithic construct of the 'north'.  In reality, he says, 
there is no monolithic north, but rather a 'core' (Muslim) north and a 'lower' (mixed) north of 
the Middle Belt (2004: 271). In terms of the ethno-regional conflict Mustapha point to the 
issue of fundamentally different values and with reference to Rawls, he advocate for the need 
for a 'sufficient consensus' being the foundation of society, holding it together (2004: 273). 
Amongst different political formations across Nigeria there are significantly different 
perceptions of- and attitudes towards the state and according to Mustapha 'While northern 
centralizing  and hegemonic instincts are dysfunctional and ultimately unsustainable, southern 
demands for ethnic federalism and its associated xenophobia, are in my view, ahistorical and 
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impractical (Mustapha 1999; 2004: 274-275).   
Nnoli (2008) claim that it is necessary to explore the link between ethnicity and the state as 
ethnicity also can pose 'a threat to the democratic process' (Okwudiba Nnoli 2008: 13). He 
does however, refer to the solidarity aspect of ethnicity stating that 'ethnicity holds individuals 
together, gives them internal cohesion, encourages them to provide mutual security for each 
other and promotes their sense of identity and direction.'  Apart from solidarity, he claims it 
promotes democracy as well by promoting the desire to curb the generic problems of 
domination, oppression, deprivation, alienation, marginalisation, exploitation and privileges. 
In Nigeria the struggle against these social problems ‘are reflected in the demand against 
marginalization of ethnic groups and against injustice in inter-ethnic resource distribution' 
(Okwudiba Nnoli, 2008: 15). Nnoli therefore conclude that ethnicity has a positive side to it 
which promotes solidarity and democracy. 
 
 
2.4.6 Summary 
In summary, studies on the political aspect of ethnicity show that ethnopolitics can have both 
negative and positive aspects. The mobilising aspect of ethnicity can be seen as both an 
opportunity and an obstacle. Ethnicity can thus be an instrument for “good” and “bad” 
depending on how it is used; it can for instance be misused as in the case of politicians 
pretending to fight for ethnic interests. One can however, not be sure whether those using 
ethnicity for a 'good' cause are sincere or not. This is due to another issue, being the tension 
between ethnic and national interests and between ethnic nations and the federal nation-state. 
The Nigerian federation's objective is to pursue a diversified unity, which we have seen from 
the studies of the scholars above, can be used both against the nation-state by self-identifies 
ethnic groups and by the nation-state. Whereas ethnic sectarianism is a threat to democracy 
and unity, empowerment of ethnic groups through mobilisation is regarded as strengthening 
democratic aspirations. Politicians are found on both sides of this spectre as they advocate 
sub-national and state-national causes. The tendency of the instrumentalist perspective has 
been to share a view in which the aim behind the political guises is competition for and 
manipulation for state power and control. Vaughan is however critical of this view regarding it 
reductionist and this critique is the focus for the next section.  
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2.5 Critiques regarding reductionism 
Vaughan (2001) is not the only one who is critical to some aspects of the instrumentalist take 
on ethnopolitics. The instrumentalist view is based on scholars’ assumptions that ethnicity 
was and is being used by the elite arguably to acquire money and wealth by mobilising 
Nigerians against each other. Ukiwo's (2005) problem with this approach is that it is top-down 
and built on the assumption that the mass public is passive and only acts when encouraged by 
the elite. Another problem pointed out by Ukiwo is its failure to explain the ‘convergence of 
elite-mass interests for political action’ and that it fails to acknowledge ‘the possibility of the 
masses manipulating the elite' (Ukiwo 2005: 8). The instrumentalist approach is thus criticised 
for being reductionist by failing to address adequately the dynamic aspects of ethnicity. The 
top-down, or one-way manipulation represents a static rather than dynamic view of ethnicity 
and ethnopolitics. Ukiwo point to research 'elsewhere' indicating that when involved in ethnic 
politicking elites respond to mass-expectations (Ukiwo 2005: 8).  
 
The reductionist critique also deals with the failure to encompass intra-ethnic conflicts and the 
micro- or individual level of ethnicity. The neglect of intra-ethnic conflicts is according to 
Ukiwo, due to the assumption that elites instigate conflicts to serve their own personal 
interests. While denying popular agency, studies on ethnicity have privileged the colonial, 
post-colonial, and the agency of ethnic elites. This instrumentalist assumption has according 
to Ukiwo yet to demonstrate that there is no 'congruence between the interests of the ethnic 
leaders and those of their followers' (Ukiwo 2005: 16). Sam Egwu (1998) criticizes the 
instrumentalist approach of overdrawing the 'group or collective dimension of ethnicity' thus 
overlooking the micro- or individual level of ethnicity. In line with Vaughan (2001) and 
Ukiwo (2005), Egwu criticizes the approach for presenting simplified, reductionist 
explanations, especially those explanations only emphasising the political elite's manipulation 
of ethnicity. With reference to Ake (1994: 51), Egwu suggests that ‘ethnicity is a dialectic of 
imagination and reality'. Egwu further claim that the modernisation school’s view of ethnicity 
as a colonial product falls into the essentialist pitfall: ‘It is then concluded that it [ethnicity] is 
essentially unreal’ (Egwu 1998: 22).  
 
 
2.6 Alternative perspectives 
Kastfelt (2003) introduces an alternative way of viewing ethnicity as opposed to the trend of 
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stressing the historicity of ethnicity and argue that ethnicity should not be seen exclusively in 
constructivist and contextual terms. His suggestion is to follow John Lonsdale's distinction of 
'moral ethnicity' and 'political tribalism'. Kastfelt argues that such a distinction will offer a 
more 'complex historical understanding of ethnicity' (Kastfelt 2003: 205). Moral ethnicity is 
defined by Lonsdale as '...the common human instinct to create out of the daily habits of 
social intercourse and material labour a system of moral meaning and ethical reputation 
within a more or less imagined community'  (Kastfelt 2003: 205) and political tribalism as 'the 
use of ethnic identity in political competition with other groups' (2003:205). 
 
While arguing that the instrumentalist perspective lends too big a role to the elite(s), that does 
not, however, disprove that instrumental usage take place. There does not have to be a 
contradiction, rather one can point to a two-fold instrumental usage of ethnicity in which both 
the mass and the elite play the roles of the manipulators and the manipulated.  Whether the 
elite(s) or ruling class(es) are working towards a protection of the status quo or not  is thus 
left for further studies. Such a line of thinking can be seen as reductionist building on the 
assumption or expectation that all Nigerians are selfish and greedy. The important issue here 
is 'the perception of inequality held by actors rather than the actual inequality that leads to 
action' (Osaghae 1995: 21). Acknowledging that  inequalities on a federal level has shaped 
national inter-ethnic animosity, Ukiwo also argue that 'most of the conflicts have arisen out of 
perceptions of inequalities at the local and state levels' (Ukiwo 2005: 13). It is therefore not so 
much the actual inequalities, but the attitudes stirred up by perceptions of inequality that are 
important to encompass in ethno political studies. 
 
 
2.7 My Focus 
As Ukiwo has pointed out the instrumentalist approach and previous studies on ethnicity in 
Nigeria have failed to address the reversed case of bottom-up usage, rather than top-down 
manipulation. The latter concept of the masses being able to manipulate the elite has not been 
tested to the same extent as the former. Or in other words the democratic potential of 
ethnopolitics has not been elaborated to the same extent as that of the potential for elite(s) 
manipulation and exploitation. 
The perception of inequalities is important, but furthermore the perception of group identity, 
and attitudes towards ethnic groups. These are important elements that few scholars on 
Nigeria address. Anugwom (2000), is an exception from this rule, writing on ethnic conflict 
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and democracy in Nigeria. She claims that ethnicity implies ethnocentric feelings in which 
groups view each other as inferior and as rivals. Such feelings furthermore brings about 
'certain attitudes, which distort reality and breed subjectivity in the evaluation and perception 
of events’ (Edlyne E Anugwom: 2000: 64). Anderson (2006) speaks of the nation as 'an 
imagined community' (2006: 6) and compared to Anugwom's description, ethnicity can as 
well be seen as an imagined community existing because people within the group agree on it, 
in some cases as a reaction to their shared ill-treatment by another group. Scholars such as 
Barth, Jenkins, and Stone offer a solid background for the before-mentioned perceptions of 
inequality and attitudes towards internal and external ethnic identity or identities.  
   
Barth distinguish between the processes of internal definition and the processes of external 
definition, where the internal definition is the self-definition expressed to both in- or out-
group members, and where the external definition can be seen as the process in which one 
person or persons define the other(s) (Jenkins 2003: 60). Drawing on Barth's distinction 
between external and internal definitions, Jenkins (2003: 63) further emphasise the distinction 
of 'I' and 'me' borrowed from Mead (1934: 173-226). Whereas the ‘I’ of the ‘self’ responds to 
others, the 'me' is a constellation of the incorporated attitudes and responses of others (Jenkins 
2003: 63). Jenkins further argues that there will usually be some interaction between the self-
image(s) and the public-image(s) and that in this interaction there will be some 'process of 
conscious or unconscious adjustment in the ongoing process of the making and re-making of 
social identity....' (Jenkins 2003: 65). Stone (2003), drawing on Roth and Wittich (1968: 389), 
state that Weber is determined to see the question of “presumed identity” as the core of the 
difference between ethnic groups. Jenkins (2003) further state through the process of 
‘internalisation’, among other ways, categorisation can contribute to group identity as the 
group being externally categorised assimilate bits of or the entire description into its own 
identity. (Jenkins 2003: 68). 
 
Ethnicity is a highly complex concept as it is extremely dynamic and static at the same time. 
In Edward Said’s (2003) “Orientalism”, Said criticize the West (Europe and North America) 
for taking the role of the subject while assigning the rest of the world, the “Orient”, the role of 
the object. The criticism further deals with how the “Orient” is essentially different from the 
“Occident”, the West. In effect of being the object, the “Orient” is made “the other”. The 
“Occident” is the ideal whereas the “other” is the opposite of the ideal. In terms of ethnicity 
being both dynamic and static what individual or which group is regarded the “other” might 
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change, but not the negative feelings associated with the “other”. The instrumentalist 
approach can therefore be seen as having both a dynamic and essentialist view of ethnicity as 
ethnopolitics are based on manipulations of stereotypes of the “other” or the “dominated”. My 
aim for this thesis is therefore to emphasise that ethnopolitics is not only governed by the 
elite(s), but can be used as an instrument by the masses as well. I further opt for an 
instrumentalist perspective which accommodates both dynamic and “static” aspects of 
ethnicity and ethnopolitics while avoiding the reductionist pit-fall. I wish to make creative use 
of existing theory, by “refining” it. In line with my research objectives I aim to demonstrate 
that there is a dynamic connection between religion, politics, and identity. By adapting a 
“refined” and dynamic instrumentalist approach, I will be able to analyse how attitudes 
towards identity are mobilised and expressed by various political actors and for different 
political purposes.  
  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Current studies dealing with the dynamic of religion, politics, and identities have tended to 
lean towards a constructivist, instrumentalist and institutionalist perspective on ethnicity. The 
instrumentalist perspective has been criticized for over-emphasising the ethnopolitical issue of 
elite domination and manipulation the so-called 'dumb mass' versus 'clever elite' (Ukiwo 
2005). Ukiwo points to the fact that there has been made studies that reveal instances of 
elite(s) responding to mass expectations (Ukiwo 2005). By focusing more on a two-way 
instrumental usage, scholars within the instrumentalist school of thought can escape the 
critique of being reductionist as it shows that the instrumental usage is not only static, but 
dynamic as well. The instrumentalist approach cannot however, entirely escape the criticism 
of being reductionist as the instrumental usage of ethnic identity and manipulations are based 
on stereotypes of the “other”. There are scholars who emphasise the importance of perceived 
inequalities (Jinadu 2002) rather than the reactions to inequalities, and who focus on the 
attitudes within ethnic-identities towards other identities (Jenkins 2003; Anugwom 2000). My 
aim is therefore to add another layer to the existing theory by adding a new perspective. I will 
adapt a two-way instrumentalist perspective in which the manipulation or usage is bottom-up 
as well as top-down. I shall not focus so much on class struggle or struggle over resources as 
source of conflict, but rather explore the importance of individuals’ attitudes towards in-group 
and out-groups and the dynamic of internal and external group identification.  
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
My main research objective is about ethnic identity and concerning the relationship between 
the dynamic of religion and politics and the concept of ethnic identity. This chapter aims at 
describing and explaining the methodology and methods applied to answer my research 
questions through an 'intensive' analysis of a single case, namely Nigeria. This case study is 
one of those instances 'where the 'case' is the focus of interest in its own right' (Bryman 
2008:53) and where the case lays the foundation for 'intensive analysis' (2008: 53).  
Studies on ethnic conflict tend to focus on factors such as economy, development, struggle for 
land, or the metaphysical factor of religion. So-called ethnic conflicts are complex in nature 
and all the above-mentioned factors are important to include. Nevertheless, my emphasis is on 
what people think about each other or what they think they know rather than what they do to 
one another. It is my strong conviction that attitudes should be the onset for positive change. It 
is a person's attitudes that determine his or her actions. My thesis therefore aims not only to 
investigate the dynamic of religion, politics and identity, but offer a different perspective to 
the existing polemic. In the following paragraphs I give an account for my choices of research 
design, data material, and research methods. It is furthermore my ambition to present how it 
was carried out, and why it can be considered a fresh contribution to existing literature. By 
illustrating how this case study was carried out I hope to convince the readers of this thesis 
that it has credibility, transferability, confirmability, and authenticity, as suggested by current 
guidelines for good academic work (Bryman 2008: 377-380). 
 
 
3.2 Why Nigeria and why case study? 
I have always been fascinated by the African continent from an anthropological point of view. 
This fascination combined with my general interest in so-called religious or ethnic conflicts 
must be the most foundational reason for this case study. I chose case study over other 
methods because a case study is based on empirical data which 'investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident' (Yin 2009:18). A good range of studies have 
been carried out on the topic of civil war, about ethnic tension in the north, oil-spillage in the 
south. These are all interesting topics, but my intention was to offer a more holistic picture by 
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looking at the wider contemporary -rather than historical or socio-economical context. I 
wanted to understand the dynamic of ethnic identity, religion, and politics. Nigeria and the 
Nigerian presidential election offered a good platform for the analysis of this dynamic as 
politicians’ political rhetoric tends to unseal attitudes towards the “other” by classifying “in” 
and “out” groups.  More on practical methods for addressing this issue will be dealt with in 
greater detail in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
3.3 Methods 
The aim of this and the following paragraphs is to address the manner in which the case study 
was investigated; how data was collected, and which research instruments were applied to the 
data and how. I start with how the data was collected. 
 
3.3.2 Data Selection and collection 
In order to understand the given dynamic I chose to study newspapers from around the time of 
the election, April 2011. I sought to find two newspapers that were fairly equal in terms of 
contents and standard. Preferably one should be from the 'North' and from the 'South' of 
Nigeria as I hoped it might reveal different views or attitudes towards the president and the 
election, given that the president is a Christian from the South and that the majority in the 
North are Muslims. The two newspaper agencies ‘The Guardian' and ‘Daily Trust’ are located 
in Lagos and Abuja respectively. ‘Weekly Trust’ and ‘Sunday Trust' are the weekend editions 
of the ‘Daily Trust’. The newspapers fulfilled my “regional” requirements, but Abuja and 
Lagos can, however, be considered “neutral” given Abuja’s status as capital and Lagos’ as 
commercial capital.  
 
At first I wanted to use online newspapers, but due to limited availability online and in some 
cases relocation of the newspapers’ internet addresses, I had to change my strategy. Instead of 
looking at online editions I therefore collected and photocopied paper copies of the same 
newspapers from the period of April 2011. One of the main reasons that I opted for online 
material was the issue of practicality and possible costs of having the newspapers sent from 
Nigeria to Norway. This problem was however solved as I was able to collect the data 
personally, at the Nigerian National Library in Abuja, during a private trip to Nigeria in 
November 2011. My intention was to collect data from three newspapers, but due to limited 
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access at first and later due to limited time this was not carried out. Time would not allow it as 
I feared that the total sum of data might turn out to be far too extensive. 
 
I found the collection of newspapers more practical than interviewing people as everything is 
already transcribed and written, and furthermore everything is said in public. Furthermore, 
newspapers may also be more practical due to the limitation of time as a master thesis will not 
allow for a lengthy ethnographic study. There are therefore fewer considerations to be made in 
terms of finding informants, planning the meeting, transcribing, and the big issue of ethical 
responsibility. However, as a researcher, I did not have the same opportunity to ask follow-up 
questions as the questions had already been posed and customised by somebody else. It was 
my aspiration that the newspaper excerpts would offer a different perspective given their 
nature as more spontaneous and oral in form than other written sources. Fortunately they did.  
I was able to spot different perspectives by applying discourse analysis as my analytical tool. I 
will return to how this 'tool' was applied in the following paragraph.  
 
 
3.3.3 Discourse analysis 
During the Nigerian presidential election campaign, politicians tend to compete over the 
electorate. It is in this competition that Nigerian politicians made use of rhetoric, as politicians 
often do, which emphasised themselves as the “good guys” and their opponents as the “bad 
guys”. My strategy was to examine the process of classifying others as “good” or “bad”, or in 
other terms “in” and “out”. I established a typology of the newspapers presentations of 
Nigerians and Nigerian society. While carefully examining articles, comments, adverts, and 
cartoons, I identified media patterns of established groups or positions that “stood out”. Given 
the nature of the data as containing political rhetoric in terms of both text and image, I was 
applied the theory and methods of discourse analysis. 
 
 
3.3.4 Applying theory to data 
Having identified different ‘positions' of Nigerians, based on newspapers accounts, I 
furthermore identified that there was a certain political-correctness genre. What I mean by this 
is that there appeared to be a codex, a set of unwritten rules governing the wider political 
discourse. These rules included the subscription to particular key words making up the 
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rhetoric of the political discourse. I will now turn to the theoretical part of the discourse 
analysis in which I make use of Laclau and Mouffe's terminology of floating signifiers and 
empty signifiers. According to them a discourse is established as meaning is crystallized 
around some “nodal points” or privileged signs/elements. Other less privileged signs are then 
given their meaning in relation to these. The “nodal points” can often be termed “floating 
signifiers” as there are some elements that are highly fluctuating -with room for different 
meanings. The floating signifiers are elements or signs that different actors struggle to fill 
with their own contents in their own particular way (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 34: 40; 
Laclau and Mouffe 1990: 28; Laclau 1993b: 287).  The key elements can thus be seen as such 
empty or floating signifiers that carry contextual meaning. 
 
 
Identity formation 
“RHETORIC OF UNITY” 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
Democracy 
Justice 
Development 
Unity 
Equality 
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The clouds symbolise the floating signifiers or nodal points that make up what I have labelled 
the “Rhetoric of Unity”. Laclau and Mouffe (Jørgensen and Louise 1999; Laclau and Mouffe 
1990; Laclau 1993b) also introduce the terms “chains of equivalence” and chains of 
difference”. These are terms that can be used in many ways, what is outlined below is 
therefore my own implementation of these terms. On one hand, the floating signifiers can 
generate “chains of equivalence” by actors within the discourse sharing the usage, but not the 
contents of the key elements. The key elements are thus “signs” of membership or “in group” 
of the political-correctness discourse. On the other hand these can also be used to express “out 
groups” through “chains of difference”. These “out-groups” can be likened to that of Edward 
Said's terminology of the “other” (Said 2003).  The “chains of difference” are to a varied 
degree of discreteness expressed through posters, images, metaphors, and metaphoric 
language. These mechanisms for classifying other individuals or groups into different 
categories of “in” and “out” can thus be seen as a contributing to the reader's attitudes to such 
groups -what they think of such people and thus to a kind of “external” identity formation.  
Among the key elements “unity” can be seen as the overarching sign, which is why I have 
labelled the political rhetoric within the discourse for the “Rhetoric of Unity”. Whereas 
politicians and the elite(s) in general wish to communicate the image of a united Nigeria they 
make use of “unity”. In the same manner, when individuals make comments in the 
newspapers object to the existence of a united Nigeria, they make use of “unity” while 
arguing for the separation of Nigeria. Though agreeing on either the existing unity or a “new” 
unity, the key elements are used to both include and exclude within the group of “agreement”. 
The “Rhetoric of Unity” can therefore be used by actors within the political discourse who 
come from different ‘positions’ described in the media, not only the position of ‘politicians’ or 
the ‘elite’. The various actors may, however, as I have illustrated above, use it for different 
purposes. 
 
 
3.4 Limitations 
The limitation of this thesis is that I focus on ‘media positions’ rather than real positions of 
Nigerians within Nigerian society. Hence, the findings of my case study are also based on 
how the reality is presented in the newspapers, not the actual reality. Though ‘reality’ in itself 
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can be rendered constructed and relative, I see this as one of the main weaknesses of my 
work. Nevertheless, I would claim that the method and data selection of this case study has 
offered an interesting perspective that may well be combined with other types of methods and 
data in future research.  
 
 
3.5 Considerations 
A newspaper is a public means of disseminating information and there are consequently not 
that many ethical considerations to be made in relation to what is already written. I do 
mention names of individuals either interviewed or reported to have shared their opinion in 
one way or the other. I have chosen not to conceal their identity as their statements are already 
published I assume that they have given their consent. There are however considerations to be 
made as to how I as a researcher analyse and report the data. “The pen is a dangerous 
weapon” and I have to be careful in giving a fair interpretation of the characters I have 
described. For the sake of transparency it is also important to be conscious of and to underline 
for the reader that the description of the material is based on how the newspapers view the 
different positions or groups in Nigerian society. One must therefore be aware that the 
“Nigerians” described somehow are “constructed” in that they are presented through the 
media and through me as a researcher. This is perhaps one of the weaknesses of my study and 
according to Bryman (2008: 391), critique of qualitative research points to the following 
issues: 
 
• too subjective 
• difficult to replicate 
• problems of generalisation 
• lack of transparency 
 
There may perhaps never be room for sweeping generalisations as the social world is ever 
shifting and developing, generalisations may be seen as temporary constructs which is why 
they may be difficult to replicate. Lack of transparency and subjective interpretations and 
presentations can, however, be refuted and I intend to do my best in order to overcome these 
pitfalls. Making use of the critique as guidelines I attempt to avoid these by giving an 
adequate account of my research choices, analytical framework, arguments, references, and 
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by showing consciousness towards my role as a researcher. 
 
 
3.6 Method conclusions 
My main research objective is concerning the relationship between the dynamic of religion, 
politics, and ethnic identity. The aim for this chapter has been to provide an outline of the 
methodology and methods options opted for in order to answer my research objectives. I have 
chosen the single case study as research design and discourse analysis as my method drawing 
on the terminology of “floating signifiers” as outlined by Laclau and Mouffe (1990: 28, 
1993b: 287, ) by Jørgensen & Phillips (1999: 34-40). This chapter also seek to fulfil the 
ethical requirements that a good academic work should have and I hope to have reached the 
goal of presenting a transparent account of my study by giving an outline of choices in terms 
of research design, data material, and research methods. The focus for the following chapter is 
a more detailed overview of the data material and a presentation of “Nigerian positions” as 
depicted in the media.  
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4. Nigerian positions 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim for this chapter is to present and describe newspaper texts constituting my data. 
I will present four different “media positions” within Nigerian society. I display and 
categorize how some Nigerian identities are characterised and presented in and by the media. 
The “positions” are therefore the Newspapers' presentation of different social positions 
necessarily the situation on the ground. I am taking on a descriptive role to construct a 
typology of the classifications that Nigerian media uses. I find that presenting the available 
social positions in the Nigerian “mediascape” is useful to convey attitudes towards identity in 
Nigerian newspapers. Understanding these attitudes is crucial in order to address the research 
objectives and questions outlined for this thesis (see ch.1). The typology is based on a 
dichotomy between religious, ethnic, and regional groups. It describes three main positions 
within these; “misguided”, “moderate”, “Nigerian leaders”, and fourth “Boko Haram”. 
Among the three main positions there are extreme, moderate and democratic elements on both 
sides of the religious, ethnic, and regional divisions. By describing these positions I aspire to 
give a thorough introduction to the data material in such a way that it serves as a background 
for- and prepare the way for the main analysis in chapter 5.  
 
 
4.2 Boko Haram 
“Boko Haram”, which directly translated means something like “book forbidden” (Bargery 
Hausa Dictionary), is presented by the media as a Nigerian terrorist group whose ideal is 
religious revival while eradicating the presence of so-called “Western” values (Idris 2011b: 
2). Nigeria has, as we shall see later, many “extreme” opinion-holders. Jama’aful Ahlul sunna 
wal Liddawati wal Jihad1 aka Boko Haram is, nonetheless, a special case in that they appear 
to kill other Muslims including Muslim clerics. The day before the presidential election was 
to be held; one could read in the Abuja based newspaper Weekly Trust that ‘An Islamic cleric 
was also shot dead in Maiduguri by gunmen suspected to be Boko Harams...’ (Idris 2011c: 5). 
The attack was also confirmed by a state Police Commisioner, Mr. Mike Zuokumor, who 
stated that intelligence reports had suggested that the Boko Haram group have a list of people 
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they wish to eliminate and that many clerics, police, army and ward heads already have been 
killed (Idris 2011a: 7). 
In the example below, the Boko Haram is portrayed as a group that symbolise the spread of 
fear and insecurity and who show no interest in negotiations. Their self-presentation in the 
media also makes them appear rather extreme given the demands stated in their letter. The 
following article is a media presentation of a three page letter, which supposedly is written by 
Boko Haram in both Arabic and Hausa.  
 “We are calling on Muslims all over the world, especially those in Nigeria, to understand that 
we need fairness from everybody because God has commanded us in the Holy Quran to be just 
in our dealings. We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out Jihad (religious 
war) in Nigeria and our struggle is based on the traditions of the holy prophet. We will never 
accept any system of government apart from the one stipulated by Islam because that is 
the only way Muslims can be liberated. We do not believe in any system of government, be 
it traditional or orthodox except the Islamic system and that is why we will keep on fighting 
against democracy, capitalims, socialism and whatever. We will not allow the Nigerian 
Constitution to replace the laws that have been enshrined in the Holy Qur'an, we will not 
allow adulterated conventional education (Boko) to replace Islamic teachings. We will not 
respect the Nigerian government because it is illegal. We will continue to fight its military and 
its police because they are not protecting Islam. We do not believe in the Nigerian judicial 
system and we will fight anyone who assist the government in perpetrating illegalities” the 
group said' (Idris 2011b: 2, Bold letters my emphasis). 
 
In the letter issued to newsmen in Maiduguri, Boko Haram demand that Sharia shall replace 
the current Nigerian constitution and democracy and threaten to continue spreading insecurity 
if such demands are not met. The group also stated that they will not accept any negotiations 
with or accept amnesty by the government. The “media position” Boko Haram appear ruthless 
by showing no remorse for those killed, claiming that they were justified killings serving their 
cause: ‘We are not sorry for all the people that we are killing, including ward heads, 
politicians, police and the army because they were associating themselves with the 
government by arresting Muslim brothers and sabotaging Islam’ (Idris 2011b: 2). The group 
further claim that they are fighting for the right of religious freedom for Muslims: 
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“We want to make it clear that we are fighting not just because our mosque and centre of 
learning were destroyed in Maiduguri, or because we were chased out of our houses. The 
reason we are at war is because our freedom has been curtailed. For time immemorial, we 
have been advocating for freedom of worship and assembly and the need for everyone to 
believe in Allah. We have been preaching that people should jettison modern democracy and 
embrace Islam as their religion” (Idris 2011b: 2, my emphasis). 
 
The “fighting” or what many non-Boko Harams would term “terrorism” is in this letter 
described as their “obligation”. In this presentation of Boko Haram in Weekly Trust, they are 
complaining of provocation by the government and Islamic working against them. While the 
members of the group ‘were carrying out their religious obligation in 2009, they were 
provoked by the government, which according to them connived with some Imams and ward 
heads and attacked their members in many states’ (Idris 2011b: 2). It is however interesting to 
note that while “advocating” for “freedom of worship” which one would relate to human 
rights the group is asking “people” to ‘jettison modern democracy’. This stands out as a bit of 
a paradox, unless the meaning is that the democracy of Islam or what they have been 
advocating since ‘time immemorial’ is the correct as opposed to modern democracy which is 
not based on Islam. Still, it is interesting to see the usage of modern terminology while 
advocating for something which is often rendered traditional and archaic. The usage of 
concepts such as “democracy” and “unity” is an issue that I will return to in the main analysis 
in chapter 5.  
 
The media position labelled Boko Haram is full of accusations, but also self-representations, 
of extremism and violence. The position can be described as extremist in that the group make 
extreme claims of an ideal society based on Islam and Muslim subjects, but also that they go 
to extreme measures to fulfil their goals by attacking other Muslims including Muslim clerics. 
It is not always easy to tell whether a bombing is caused by Boko Haram or other groups 
resorting to extreme measures, one example being the bomb blasts in Kaduna the day after the 
presidential election. According to the newspaper report, the police said they had arrested four 
foreigners that were ‘nationals of Niger Republic and a Nigerian suspect’ (Akhaine 2011b: 3). 
The Police further claimed that ‘the suspects belong “to a dangerous organisation” (Akhaine 
2011b: 3). In this case it is left for the readers to assume whether this “dangerous 
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organisation” is Boko Haram or not. Name-given or not Boko Haram is an element of fear 
and insecurity in Nigerian society. It appears that they also enjoy a great deal of respect as 
well as being feared, given that the newspaper bothered to publish their letter to such great 
length.  
The Boko Haram is in my material presented as ruthless as they do not regret any killing and 
fearless by killing even the police. They are further presented as a group who see it as their 
duty to fight for the freedom of worship and the abolishment of the secular constitution, 
which should be replaced with Sharia Law. While anti-democratic they do advocate for the 
‘freedom of worship’ which is a more democratic and secular terminology and it is therefore 
interesting to see it in use here while advocating for a religious “fundamentalist” state. In the 
following sub-chapter we shall focus on how the (less) extreme positions of “misguided” 
elements are portrayed.  
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4.3 Extreme positions: “Misguided” elements 
Newspapers often blame violence related to the presidential election on “misguided 
elements”. I use this term to describe a ‘position’ established by the media which covers a 
range of different labels: irate youths, angry youths, rampaging youths, mob, hoodlums, 
political thugs, criminals, gunmen, and rioters. These “misguided” elements can be found 
among descriptions of both “Christians” and “Muslims”, and among both “Southerners” and 
“Northerners”. Northerners, whether Christian or Muslim, are however more frequently found 
in these categories. I have divided the “misguided” elements into three different categories: 
political positions, religious positions, and regional positions. Within each of these three 
categories there are antagonisms expressed through the dichotomies of CPC v PDP (political 
positions), Muslim v Christian (religious positions) and Northerners v Southerners (regional 
positions). The political positions express antagonisms through protests, religious positions 
through responses, and the regional positions through stereotyping. CPC is an abbreviation for 
Congress for Progressive Change, a political party led by General Muhammadu Buhari, a 
former military leader of Nigeria. PDP is an abbreviation for Peoples’ Democratic Party. PDP 
was led by Muusa Yar’ Adua, until his vice President and now incumbent President Goodluck 
Jonathan took over in succession of Yar’Adua’s recent death. As mentioned in the 
introduction of this chapter, my aim is to illustrate the complex group formations in Nigeria as 
depicted in and through the media of Nigerian newspapers. My research questions are 
concerned with the dynamic of religion, politics, and ethnic identity and about how in- and 
out- groups are expressed. The descriptions are thus offered as a platform for expanding on 
the research questions outlined in chapter 1.  
 
 
4.3.1 Characteristics of the “misguided” elements 
I will now offer the characteristics of media presentations of the “misguided” elements. The 
term “misguided elements” is borrowed from one of the President's media statements on the 
post-election crisis under the heading “Why Nigeria must be united, by President Jonathan”: 
  
'Sadly, some misguided elements do not share in the spirit of our democratic achievements. 
They formed into groups of miscreants; and struck with deadly and destructive force in some 
parts of the country. They killed and maimed innocent citizens. They set ablaze business 
premises, private homes and even places of worship. In some cases, they showed utter 
disrespect to all forms of authority, including our most revered traditional institutions. They 
37 
 
systematically targeted population groups. They singled out and harassed nationalistic 
politicians. They intimidated travellers. The mobs also targeted government offices and 
facilities’ (The Guardian 2011a: 9, my emphasis). 
 
The “misguided” elements are here also described as groups of miscreants and mobs. They 
are characterised as anti-democratic as they do not ‘share in the spirit of our democratic 
achievements’ and as unpatriotic by singling out and harassing ‘nationalistic politicians’. The 
“misguided” elements are moreover described as brutal by striking with deadly and 
destructive force killing innocent citizens. They did, however, not strike everywhere but in 
‘some parts of the country’. The “misguided” elements are further depicted as misguided by 
their ‘disrespect to all forms of authority’ and as they are presented as targeting almost 
everybody and everything; innocent citizens, travellers, politicians, traditional and 
governmental institutions, places of worship, and even the idea of nationalism and democracy. 
In summary, they are presented as being against almost all Nigerians, and all Nigerian 
institutions whether traditional, political, or religious. In another newspaper, Daily Trust, the 
“misguided” elements are described as youths, political supporters, and hoodlums. 
 
'Last Saturday, youths in Jalingo protested alleged manipulation of election results (…) the 
protest  spilled over to neighbouring towns of Bali, Gassol and Mutum-Biyu, where fighting 
between party supporters left two persons dead (…) Meanwhile, there is an uneasy calm in 
the capital town of Jalingo as youths yesterday took to the streets celebrating a coup rumour. 
(…) But the police commissioner dismissed the youths as hoodlums who wanted to use the 
opportunity of the election to commit crime’ (Idris 2011a: 6, my emphasis). 
 
In the passages above the “misguided” elements are described as angry youths, and hoodlums, 
but it is not stated where these angry youths belong in terms of ethnicity, religion, or political 
party. We are as readers told that the protest was political and between angry youths and 
political supporters in the “North”, or more precisely Taraba state in the Middle-Belt, the 
intersection between the North and the South. As readers we are also presented with the claim 
that these youths are simply troublemakers and are dismissed as “hoodlums” searching for an 
opportunity to commit crime. In the following passages I will deal with the dichotomisation of 
Christians and Muslims. I have identified so-called “misguided” elements on both sides of the 
traditional divide between Christians and Muslims, and between the ruling PDP and the 
oppositional CPC party. First I will explore the two main political positions (CPC and PDP) 
and their view of one another. 
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4.3.2 Political positions 
The CPC is led by a Muslim, General Buhari, while his running mate, Pastor Tunde Bakare is 
a Christian. PDP is the ruling party with a Christian President and a Muslim Vice President. 
The PDP has been the ruling party for more than a decade and supporters of Buhari are 
reported to see CPC as a key to change. CPC-supporters who voted en mass for Buhari are 
further depicted as regarding the defeat a result of a dirty game played by the federal 
government and PDP-members. Many allegations have been stated in the media concerning 
cheating, such as intimidation, and rigging as in stealing of ballot boxes, bribery, and so on 
and so forth. This alleged dirty game appears, however, to have brought up old divisions. 
Though the protesters were reported to be protesting on political grounds the religious divide 
somehow found its way to the surface. In the following paragraphs I will give an outline of 
“misguided” elements among PDP- and CPC-supporters, starting with the PDP. 
 
 
PDP supporters and cheaters 
PDP-supporters are often displayed in my material as cheaters and ballot-snatchers and their 
cheating as cause of “misguided” behaviour. In a letter to the editor in Weekly Trust a Nigerian 
stated that 'Rampaging youth in Northern Nigeria went on the streets in protest against what 
they perceived as robbery of their votes; haven voted en mass for General Muhammadu 
Buhari’ (Ibrahim A. 2011: 37). Moreover, even killings are in the next excerpt below 
displayed as explainable from this perspective. The heading of the news story below is 
“Violence, fraud mar presidential poll”. 
 
'According to reports, there was tension in Kabala yesterday during the presidential polls 
 because Muslims were allegedly refused to vote, a claim that has not been verified by Sunday 
 Trust. In Bauchi State, two persons were killed by irate youths for an alleged attempt to 
snatch a ballot box at Kofar Dumi Polling Unit in Bauchi metropolis yesterday. According to a 
spokesman for  the CPC, Alhaji Aliyu Sa'idu “The two youths attempted to snatch a ballot box 
and some youths stopped them. The two were beaten to death. We had cautioned our youths 
in Bauchi not to take law into their hands, but people in town were angry with  the attitudes of 
the PDP who intimidated people in order to rig the election”’ (Musa & Mushadir 2011: 2, my 
emphasis). 
 
PDP-supporters are thus presented as “misguided” by their mischievous behaviour. They are 
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also presented as “misguided” youths who provoke “misguided” behaviour by other youths or 
“misguided” elements from the oppositional CPC. 
  
 
CPC- supporters and protesters 
CPC-supporters are often reported as angry protesting youth rioting against what they see as 
an unfair election. These angry youths are also reported to frequently take matters into their 
own hands by using violence and causing mayhem, as in the example above where two 
persons accused of cheating were killed. Many of the reports cover protests that later 
escalated to riots, which took place in the middle-Belt States. In Nasarawa, for instance, 
‘angry youths poured into the streets, protesting the outcome of last Saturday's presidential 
election in which the PDP's Goodluck Jonathan won in the state’. The youth were reported to 
have been carrying ‘leaves and placards of CPC's General Muhammadu Buhari chanting 
“Nigeria, Sai Buhari”, and some anti-PDP slogans’ (Ajobe & Joseph 2011: 6). 
The protesters are further portrayed as hooligans and mobs that indiscriminately cause a lot of 
violence and damage to material wealth as well, finding local political or governmental 
targets a channel for their frustration.  In the report “Mob burn buildings in Jigawa”, Daily 
Trust states that ‘Angry youths in Jigawa State yesterday burnt many buildings in protest 
against the early results’ (Ajobe & Joseph 2011: 6). The “youths” or “misguided” elements 
did, however, also attack the convoy of General Buhari, leader of the CPC. A witness stated to 
the Abuja based newspaper Sunday Trust that ‘a sea of rampaging youths’ had stopped their 
car and that some of the youths had ‘started smashing the already battered cars’. The witness 
further said they were lucky as they ‘got some sensible people among them who even 
recognised the General's vehicles’. One of the “sensible youths” had explained to the convoy 
that ‘it was the nature of your vehicles that occasioned the attacks. You were mistaken as 
government officials who usually ride in jeeps’ (Abdallah 2011: 2). From this presentation it 
appears that CPC-supporters are a combination of angry youths, mob, and “sensible people”. 
It is interesting to note that though they claim to be CPC-supporters they are not only 
attacking the political “enemy” or opponent PDP, but government officials as well. The 
protests may therefore not only represent a conflict between the CPC and the PDP, but a 
general dissatisfaction with the Nigerian government.  
 
Politically based protests are also reported to have led to sectarian violence where religious 
individuals and institutions are targeted. In the case of Yobe, Anti-Jonathan protesters were 
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reported to have been taking over the streets ‘in protest against the just concluded presidential 
poll results while chanting “Sai Baba Buhari” (Ajobe & Joseph 2011: 6). It was also reported 
that ‘the angry youths had attempted to burn the house of the former Police Affairs Minister, 
Adamu Maina Waziri and the INEC office’ and that ‘places of worship and shops were burnt 
down’ (Ajobe & Joseph 2011: 6). Though it was a political party who lost the election, group 
identities go across political, regional, ethnic, and religious boundaries. From the media 
presentation it appears that political identity is fused with religious as protesters are attacking 
religious institutions of the opponent.  In my opinion this section from an opinion column in 
The Guardian summarise the “political position” well: 
 
‘Buhari's supporters in the Northern states have been on rampage. Mostly young, poor and 
unemployed, they are united by the anger that a Southern Christian, an unbeliever in their 
reckoning, and a product/promoter of Western education is now president-elect (…) They have 
been chanting: “mu ke so, ba muso hanni” (“It is Buhari that we want, we don't want an 
unbeliever”)’ (Abati 2011: 51).  
 
This excerpt does not only summarise the “political position”, but also sheds light on the 
dynamic of religion, politics, and ethnic identity. It helps identify the overlap of religion and 
politics, but also attitudes towards “us” and “them”. Buhari’s supporters are not presented as 
the CPC here, but it is assumed. It is also assumed that his supporters are from the North and 
that they are young poor Muslims united against a Christian South and the new President 
which is portrayed as an “unbeliever”. Though the presentation gives a stereotypical and fixed 
image of the “North” and the “South” it is relevant for expanding on how attitudes of “us” and 
“them” are expressed. In the next sub-chapter I will focus more on religious responses by the 
“misguided” elements. 
 
 
4.3.3 Religious responses 
My aim for this section is to give an outline of religious responses by “misguided” elements. 
Though my aim is to give an outline of the “misguided” elements’ religious responses, this 
proves rather challenging while religious, political, and ethnic sentiments tend to overlap. The 
focus will be on the “misguided” elements that are presented as angry Muslims or Christians. 
These positions are further depicted as both victims and “revengers”. I start by presenting 
“Angry Muslim youths”. 
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Angry Muslim youths 
Muslim youths and students are portrayed by the Lagos based newspaper The Guardian as 
irrational and irate: 
 
'Muslim students protested the demolition of their mosque by the school authority (…) In 
protest the demolition, the students went on rampage and locked the entrance gates to the 
university, thus preventing human and vehicular movement to and from the campus (…) But 
the university's Vice Chancellor, Prof. Isaac Adewole, denied the claim that the Muslim 
students were not contacted before the demolition was carried out (…) “I can't understand why 
they should go and lock the gates” ’ ( Lawal 2011: 3). 
 
Whether the students were warned or not is uncertain, but the effect of this disagreement is 
that the students are depicted as overreacting and as being oversensitive with regards to 
religion. On one hand The Guardian portrays “angry Muslim youth” as being sensitive to 
religious issues by protesting against the “attack” on their own mosque. On the other hand 
they are reported to be protesting by attacking churches as ‘irate youths in several states in the 
north had gone on rampage, attacking people, burning houses, churches’ (Akhaine 2011c: 16). 
The youths are thus presented to be responding along the lines of religion to political events 
as the attacks were ‘in protest against President Goodluck Jonathan's victory at the polls’ 
(Akhaine 2011c: 16). As mentioned initially, religious, ethnic and political sentiments overlap. 
The “misguided” elements are found across religious, political, and ethnic boundaries and are 
in the texts depicted as playing the roles of both victims and perpetrators, or “revengers”. 
 
 
Angry Christian youths  
Whereas the “Angry Muslim Youths” were described as “attackers” in the excerpts above, 
Christians are depicted by The Guardian as “revengers” while sharing the same properties as 
the former:  
 
 '(…) Malam Hamisu Shehu, 75 years old who narrated his unfortunate experience during the 
 crisis. He said he was attacked at Maraban Rido, on the outskirts of the metropolis after the 
 evening Moslem prayer (…) “We were at mosque praying when some youths came with 
 cutlasses, forced us out and started cutting some of us like grass (…)” 
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 (Akhaine 2011a: 8). 
 
Christians are reported to be revenging earlier attacks by Muslims and according to the 
Guardian ‘Hundreds are said to have died from the attacks by Moslems and reprisals by 
Christians’ (Ijediogor 2011: 55). The earlier attacks by Muslims may however have been 
“attacks” or political protests by CPC-members taking a religious turn. In the examples above 
we see how political protests are presented to escalate into religious warfare based on 
assumed group identities, roles, and stereotypes. It appears that the “Muslim” identity of 
CPC-supporters and the “Christian” of PDP-supporters are more exposed which again, 
somehow, in the eyes of the opponent legitimise such religious warfare.  
 
 
Hausa, Muslim, and CPC victims 
The newspaper Daily Trust and its weekend edition, Weekly Trust, reports about the “Zonkwa 
massacre”. The victims are described as Hausa, Muslim, and indirectly CPC, given the last 
extract where they are asked to ‘denounce CPC’. Hausa-Fulanis are described as victims as 
‘Over 150 members of the Hausa/Fulani community were allegedly killed in the post 
presidential election violence that engulfed Zonkwa (…) Kaduna State’ (Abubakar & Musa 
2011: 4). In the excerpt below Muslims and CPC supporters are portrayed as victims: 
 
‘(…) someone brought pick axes and started hacking at the mosque until it collapsed. After 
that, they descended on Alhaji Namadi's mosque and that angered Yallo, one Hausa/Fulani 
youth who protested against the action. He was shot instantly and that ignited the crisis (…) 
Able-bodied Muslims, fearing for their lives, hid in pit latrines and wells but the not-so-lucky 
ones were gunned down, slaughtered or burnt alive. The carnage stopped when they thought 
that the entire menfolk had been exterminated. However, women and children were spared but 
they were subjected to various  humiliations, including asking them to denounce CPC and 
praise PDP’ (Musa & Mushadir 2011: 2). 
 
Once again the newspapers presents a complex image of identity as religion, politics, and 
ethnicity are all intertwined. Supporters of the political party PDP are reported to carry out 
attacks on a Mosque and Muslims while forcing them to ‘denounce CPC and praise PDP’. 
Most of these excerpts are from the North, but nevertheless, it is interesting to note how 
neatly the lines are presented. The newspapers tend to draw parallels between religious, 
political, and ethnic identities. CPC-supporters are presented as Muslim, PDP- supporters as 
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Christian. In the next paragraphs I will focus on presentations of Christians and non-Muslims 
as victims to underline how identities tend to overlap, before I move on to the next sub-
section, “Regional positions”. 
 
 
Christian and non-Muslim victims 
In these stories Christians and other non-Muslims are portrayed as the victims of “misguided 
elements”. The Daily Trust reports that ‘the youths attacked some residences, whose 
occupants where perceived to be non-Muslim’ (Jaafar & Adamu 2011: 2).In another story a 
young man of twenty-four, Mr. Zakaria, gives an account of how rioters attacked their home 
and killed his sister. The newspaper does not explicitly state that Mr. Zakaria is a Christian, 
but there are given two examples of victims where the other one is a Muslim and is served in 
a hospital with a Muslim name, whereas Mr. Zakaria is treated in a Catholic hospital. 
 
‘Mr. Zakari, a 24 year-old boy from Adamawa State currently receiving treatment at Saint 
Gerrald Catholic hospital, Kakuri. He narrated to The Guardian how he lost his only sister at 
Trikania, a suburb of Kaduna town (…) “I was sleeping with my sister in the corridor (…) 
when we suddenly heard gunshots close to our compound. My only sister suddenly woke up 
without knowing what was going on (…) being confused on what the problem was really, she 
unluckily ran into the hands of the rioters with guns and cutlasses (…) and they slaughtered 
her like goat.(…) Rioters fled chanting their war songs that whosoever stood in their way 
would be destroyed” (Akhaine 2011a: 8). 
 
The “misguided” elements are here referred to as rioters who sung “war songs”. That the 
rioters “slaughtered her like goat” indicate that these “misguided” elements were Muslims and 
that the “war song” might refer to a religious warfare, at least in the first story where non-
Muslim homes were singled out. Christian institutions were also targeted during the political 
protests and in Izzi Local Council of Ebonyi State 'Suspected thugs loyal to a political party 
unleashed terror on St. Stephen's Catholic Church’ (Sobechi 2011: 15). Through media 
presentations one gets, as a reader, the impression that political issues are resolved on a 
religious level. In other words, political events are interpreted through a religious lens which 
again leads to religious responses mixed with political and ethnic sentiments.  
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4.3.4 Regional positions 
Whereas religious responses presented in the previous section appeared to be mixed with 
political and ethnic sentiments, I will now address the regional aspect to the before-mentioned 
sentiments. The aim of this section is to illustrate how stereotypes based on regional 
properties are presented in the newspapers. Some of the stereotypes are presented as ironic 
self-depictions. These presentations are also critical of stereotypes they outline and it is worth 
noticing that these accounts are all from the Abuja based newspaper Daily Trust. Outlines of 
these stereotypes may therefore be seen as a critique of the opposed “Southern” identity’s 
external classification of the “Northerner”. 
 
 
Stereotypes of Northerners 
Northerners tend to be described as angry, irate, extreme, and Muslims as illiterates, poor, as 
illustrated in this letter to the editor: ‘the anger, if not action of the youth, was shared by the 
majority people of northern extraction’ (Ibrahim A. 2011: 37). This presentation of the 
Northerner or the entire “northern extraction” presumes that there is a united “North” 
supportive of the “misguided” elements’ anger. In terms of ironic self-depictions, one Muslim 
Northerner, Mr. Ibrahim expresses the stereotypes that he expects others to have of him and 
other Northerners as ‘a parasitic Malam1 who is probably a beneficiary of quota system or a 
lazy and uneducated and backward subject of some imaginary northern oligarchy.’ (Ibrahim 
A. 2011: 37).  Another illuminating depiction of the Northerner’s expectations of stereotypes 
held towards him or her are illustrated in the excerpt below.  
 
‘It was fast becoming the perception that the Northerner is a greedy power monger, a schemer 
and an  opportunistic compromiser of ideals and compatriots for self actualization (…) the 
Northerner is seen as a religious bigot (Northerner here refers to both Christian and 
Muslim) piety on the outside, and inherent evil lurking inside. Majority of Northern youth 
have acquired the attributes of the vagabond -siddon-do-nothing and yet belly-ache on the 
influx of dream merchants, particularly Ibos, who come to the North with nothing and grow 
from shop boy to the owner of a condominium and a chain of stores. Even in the North, the 
enterprising Hausa all-year-round farmer is given land to till, and making a success of his toil, 
he gets killed as victim of hate in sectarian violence as has happened in the ethnic minority 
enclaves of the North’ (Mathias 2011: 36, my emphasis). 
                                                          
1
(Non-Christian Religions / Islam) (in Islamic W Africa) a man learned in Koranic studies 
(http://www.thefreedictionary.com/mallam ) (24.02.2012) 
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Stereotypes of Northerners as portrayed here can thus be seen as a depiction of tensions 
between the Southerners and the Northerners. The stereotypes are here somehow incorporated 
and are used to express expected negative attitudes the Southerner or others may have towards 
the Northerner. In that sense these stereotypes are in my view expressing a tensed and 
antagonistic relation between the two regional camps. Whereas previous presentations of 
“misguided” elements have circled around political or religious attributes, these excerpts 
highlight the regional factor. The texts in previous sub-sections have presented dichotomies 
along political party lines and along religious affiliations while especially this last text points 
to the stigmatisation of the “North” as troublemaker rather than any particular political, 
ethnic, or religious group. 
 
 
4.3.5 Conclusion “misguided” elements  
Within the political position there is a dichotomy of the CPC and the PDP, within the religious 
a dichotomy of the Muslims and the Christians, and within the regional a dichotomy of 
Northerners and Southerners playing on stereotypes or perceived attitudes of the counterpart. 
By giving examples of- and antagonisms within the position of “misguided elements” my aim 
has been to illustrate the complex group formations in Nigeria as depicted in and through the 
media of Nigerian newspapers. My aim has moreover been to offer a platform for answering 
the research questions of the relationship between religion, politics and identity, moreover 
how attitudes of “us” and “them” or inclusion and exclusion are expressed. The group 
formations within the position of so-called “misguided elements” can be classified into 
political, religious, and regional camps. The “misguided” or the “other” is often depicted as 
irrational or angry. Such descriptions of the “other”, serves to paint a diminutive picture of 
that person or group as childish and irresponsible. In the next sub-chapter the position of 
“moderate” elements will be outlined to add on to our existing framework on group 
formations. The presentation of the “other” and the effects of such depictions will also be 
further highlighted in chapter 5. 
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4. 4. “Moderate” elements 
In the previous sub-chapter the focus was on the position of “extreme” elements and on how 
newspapers displayed antagonisms within three categories: political, regional, and religious. 
The aim for this sub-chapter is to present coverage of the more “moderate” elements. The 
focus here is not on the antagonisms, but on the different groups’ position in terms of Nigerian 
democracy, state, and religion. The “moderate” elements often appear as columnists, 
editorials, or in the opinions section, but also some of the interviewees. These elements can be 
classified into three main positions. The first consists of elements that are against division 
because of secular (or neutral) arguments such as democracy and development. The second is 
made up of religious leaders who share religious arguments. These leaders emphasise equality 
and common traits and regard places of worship as the preferred channel for communicating 
this message of equality. The third position consists of elements that are “pro-division”. This 
position is presented as less tolerant in their use of stereotypes. Once again my aim by 
outlining the different positions is to offer a background for understanding the complex group 
formations in Nigeria as they are presented by the newspapers. By offering these descriptions 
is also aspire to approach the research objectives of this thesis concerning the relationship 
between religion, politics, and ethnic identity. 
 
 
4.4.1 Moderate Muslims 
As mentioned at the outset, I have carved out three main positions and these will also be an 
important instrument while trying to depict “moderate Muslims”. I will give an overview of 
secular and religious arguments presented against division and stereotypes which can appear 
divisive. I start with reported “Neutral or secular arguments against division”. Within this 
group everybody wants peace and unity, but for different reasons. Key words are peace, unity, 
non-violence, development. 
 
 
Neutral or secular arguments against division 
After the “Zonkwa massacre” (See section 4.3.2), one of the Muslim victims 75 year-old 
Shehu, had according to the newspaper The Guardian ‘stressed the need to live in peace with 
one another irrespective of tribe and religion’ (Akhaine 2011a: 8). The use of kinship terms 
such as “brother(s)” is also not uncommon language in the parlour of tolerance as in this 
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response sent via SMS to Weekly Trust:  
 
 ‘We are all our brothers’ keepers and there is no reason why we should kill each other over 
election disagreements (…) As Nigerians, we also inter-marry, both northerners and 
southerners. We should not allow politics to divide us’ (Abdulhamid, 2011: 38).  
 
Another aspect of those moderate pro-unity elements is that of democracy and development. 
In an SMS response to Weekly Trust’s “SMS views” column, one Nigerian compares the post-
election violence with the Arab spring and the Egyptian revolution whilst seeing the latter a 
model fit for Nigeria: 
  
‘Violent protest is no way to build a democracy. Nigerians should look at Egypt where 
peaceful protest was able to topple one of Africa's longest serving dictators. If we resort to 
violence, we achieve nothing because we can easily turn against each other, as is happening 
now. We should all embrace peace’ (Usman 2011: 38).  
 
These “moderate” Muslims are not only reported to want peace for the sake of peace, but in 
order to create good soil for democracy and socio-economic development. A news report from 
Tafawa Balewa, concerning rivalry between smaller ethnic groups, states that local politicians 
stress the need for peace for the creation of socio-economic development. For instance Senior 
Special Assistant to the State Government on Media, Sanusi Mohammed was reported to have 
‘appealed to the people in the area to embrace peace as it will help to bring socio- economic 
development in the state claiming that ‘The incessant crises in Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro 
local government draw us back. We should stop. It will only end if people in the area are 
ready to embrace peace’ (Mohammed 2011a: 11). In this media presentation, peace and unity 
is thus underlined as key factors to socio-economic development. Apart from peace and unity, 
tolerance is another aspect highlighted by “moderate” elements and Governorship candidate 
of the All Peoples Grand Alliance (APGA) in Kaduna State, Dr. Auwal Sagir is a politician 
who is portrayed as preaching tolerance. According to The Guardian, he does not ‘support a 
situation where our politics should be on religious or ethnic divide because we all need one 
another to move along’. In the newspaper account he continues to emphasise the equalities of 
the two religious camps before he shift the blame to the political scene: 'There are no separate 
markets for Christians and Muslims. We all, Christians and Muslims suffer the same 
consequences as a result of the PDP misrule’.  He thus give away his identity as a CPC 
supporter and one may question whether his quest for tolerance goes further than religion as 
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he continue to stress that Christians and Muslims are equal by stating that ‘they all read the 
same newspapers, watch the same television or listen to the same stations on the radio and 
buy the same recharge cards’. He goes on to state that as a Muslim he does not ‘see the 
Christian as an enemy’ and does not ‘expect the Christian to regard me as an enemy’. He 
further argues for the importance of bridge building between Christians and Muslims by 
underlining that they ‘should come together and look at their common challenges' (Akhaine 
2011d: 11). By referring to the PDP rather than Muslims or Christians as the enemy the 
Governorship candidate  stand out as tolerant in terms of religion and ethnicity, but less 
tolerant in terms of politics. Nevertheless he is presented as a “moderate” politician, who 
emphasises unity and bridge building across religious and ethnic divides.  
 
 
Religious arguments against division 
Unifying voices from the religious camps are in the media presented as having the tendency 
of emphasising scriptures and morals that are in line with peaceful conduct. They are 
however, also presented in the media by other leaders as rather extreme and furthermore 
indirectly accused of encouraging their members to carry out so-called violent and unpatriotic 
acts. Media-presentation of leaders is something I shall return to later in the next sub-chapter 
“4.5 Nigerian Leaders”.  
“Moderate” Muslim leaders are depicted as expressing their moderateness by openly 
emphasising the parts of Islam that forbids violence for the sake of peaceful co-existence, 
using the local mosque as a channel of communication and education. One example is Mallam 
Ahmad, a regular preacher at the local mosque who ‘had stood up in the mosque and 
admonished that Islam forbids violence as a means of registering grievances and advised the 
worshippers to register their grievances peacefully in line with the teachings of Islam’ in 
response to the ‘violence that broke out in most states of the North in protest against 
irregularities in the presidential election’ (Ibrahim H. 2011: 2). In similarity with “moderate” 
secular voices, religious voices in the media emphasise the need for peace, but also stress the 
fact that both religions are accountable. One Dr. Mamudu Dako for example ‘urged leaders to 
show maturity and avoid making statements which some misguided elements could 
misconstue to mean a call to cause trouble. “This is the time to preach peace. After all, both 
major religions, Christianity and Islam, preach peace” (Adeshole and Oyebade 2011: 4).  
Some religious leaders apparently did more than just show “maturity” and avoiding 
provocative statements according to a reader’s letter to The Guardian:  
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‘Jonathan's votes came from Christians, yes, but in considerable numbers from Muslims. The 
Sultan of Sokoto emphatically urged people to vote not on the basis of religion or ethnicity, 
but for the candidate who would move the country forward and be just to all. Other Muslim 
leaders took the same position’ (Kenny 2011: 14). 
 
Religious and traditional leaders are thus portrayed as playing an important role as 
“moderate” and democratic elements. They apparently play a unifying Nigerian society by 
urging people to vote across the lines of religion and ethnicity. An example of ‘other Muslim 
leaders’ may be organisations such as the NSCIA, or the NASFAT. NSCIA, or Nigerian 
Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, an organisation which is  
 
‘meant to promote peaceful and harmonious co-existence between Muslims, Christians and 
other religious group, to ensure that we promote patriotism and the unity of our country, 
basically to promote understanding and tolerance among religious bodies' (Adegbite 2011: 
23).  
 
Similarly, religio-political Islamic organisations are presented in the media as moderate 
promoting values of tolerance, peace, and democracy, but also as emphasising a “positive” or 
“correct” religion. For instance, the President of NASFAT (Nasrul-Lahi-il-Fathi), Alhaji 
Sheriff M. Yussuf emphasise that violence is against Islam, even against religion in general ‘It 
doesn't have any place in any religion; (…) Islam abhors violence; (…) the use of force in 
seeking anything you desire’ Mr. Yussuf further claim that it is “undemocratic” as 'Violence is 
abominable’ and as it is ‘condemned’, ‘unacceptable’, ‘undesirable’ and furthermore ‘doesn't 
fit the tenets of democracy or decent society'.  The President of NASFAT takes it as far as 
encouraging people not to vote for anyone who is a “fake” Christian or Muslim, arguing that  
 
‘if you are a true follower of Islam or a true follower of Christianity, Christianity does not 
preach violence, Islam does not preach violence (…) if any such candidates is identified with 
organising thugs, organising violence then, you know that person is not a Muslim or a 
Christian. And we should not vote for them’ (Yussuf 2011: 22). 
 
Whether extreme or moderate, religious and political sentiments overlap and as I will 
illustrate in a moment tolerance is relative. It might be pushed aside in a political “blame-
game” 
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Arguing for tolerance while partaking in the “blame-game” 
Politicians are reported to elevate themselves and their moderate and tolerant nature by 
pointing at other less tolerant personalities. However, by painting a non-tolerant picture of 
others they stand out as less tolerant themselves. Hajia Aisha Jumai Alhassan is the first 
woman from Taraba State to be elected into National Assembly and she did so while beating 
the former governor of the State, rev. Jolly Nyame. In an interview in The Guardian she was 
presented as less tolerant given statements such as  ‘We should not allow somebody that is 
selfish, like Nyame, to be using religious sentiments to divide us’ (Akpeji 2011: 8) Other 
statements are in line with the unity and peace language of other moderate Muslims, for 
example she state that  ‘I have always told people that God created the Moslems and 
Christians together and He intended that we should live together, that was why he put us in 
one state’ (Akpeji 2011: 8).  In the same statement, however, she appears to address her own 
role as a politician and as a tolerant person: ‘Religion, I always tell people, is in the mind; it 
has nothing to do with political leadership. It is a very wrong trend, but I thank God the 
people of Taraba saw it and refused to take that rubbish. Both Christians and Moslems voted 
for me and I am happy that he did not succeed’ (Akpeji 2011: 8).  
It is however, not clear from the text whether these are her exact words or whether there has 
been some editing to the contents as well as the form. Based on the newspaper data above she 
appears inconsistent. On one side she argues for the equality of Christians and Muslims while 
on the other she is partaking in a “blame-game” in which her opponent Reverend Jolly Nyame 
is targeted. 
  
 
Stereotypes  
The aim for this section is to give an outline of “moderate” stereotypes. In the presentations 
below the first online reaction presents the “Northerner” in the same category as Buhari and 
the CPC, and the “Southerner” together with President Jonathan. This view is, however, 
contested and criticised in the second online reaction. In the first online reaction below, ‘The 
Daily Trust’ presents the reader with a perspective of the “Northerner’s” attitudes towards the 
opponent group “Southerner”: 
 
 'The outcome of the result has also shown that the country has divided in two and it also 
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shows Northerners are much fairer to the Southerners than the other way round because 
Jonathan won many states in the North, while Buhari got less than 20% in all the states in the 
South' (Abdullahi 2011: 29). 
 
Another reaction regarding the election from the opinion column express the perspective of a 
Muslim as less worth listening to than a Christian, but also suggests that the positions offered 
by the media are not as black and white in reality as they appear on paper:  
 
'These responses are automatically translated for Nigerians by the Western Press as that 
Muslims dislike Jonathan because he is Christian, and love Buhari because he is a Muslim. 
This is totally wrong! But who will listen to me as I am also a Muslim?' (Musa A. 2011: 32). 
 
Stereotypes or perceived stereotypes, and responses to them serve to uphold a certain 
dichotomy whilst blaming the “other” for real or imagined inequalities, intolerance, and thus 
also for divisive tendencies. Dichotomies of “us” versus “them” playing on ideas of the 
“other” will, as mentioned earlier, be analysed in greater detail in chapter 5. 
 
 
4.4.2 Moderate Christians 
Just as religious Muslim leaders emphasise that Christians and Muslims are the same, so does 
Christian religious personalities. The aim for this section is to outline how “moderate” 
Christians are reported to make use of religious arguments against division, but also divisive 
stereotypes of the “other”. 
 
 
Religious arguments against division 
Archbishop of Kaduna Anglican Diocese, Idowu Fearon, is here presented by Daily Trust as 
preaching shared “theological truths” in order to reach out and possibly pacify more 
“extreme” Christians and Muslims:  
 
 “Let me sum all that up by saying to my Muslim – we Christians never lose sight of the fact 
that even though we are Trinitarian, we affirm that there is only one God:In fact, the orthodox 
Christians in the Middle East always say in Arabic: In the name of the Father and of the 
Son and of the Holy spirit, ONE GOD! (In Arabic: Bismilabi wal- ibni- war- ruhi- l-quddus, 
ALLAH WAHID). This is to show that in affirming the Trinity, we do not deny in any way that 
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God is one.” (Idowu-Fearon 2011: 29, my emphasis). 
  
In a comment and debate section in Sunday Trust, we can read how one Christian is 
promoting both political and religious tolerance by pointing out common treats between 
Christian and Muslims, using himself as an example: 
 
 'Indeed, Buhari, the so-called fundamentalist picked one of the most vociferous preachers of 
the Christian faith, Pastor Bakare as his running mate. (…)  If he is a fundamental Muslim, I 
give it to him, because I too, a northern Christian, am fundamental about my faith' (Asaju 
2011: 26).   
 
This shows again that the boundaries are not that clear-cut, that Christians as well can support 
General Buhari and his predominantly “Muslim” party. 
 
 
Stereotypes of the “other” 
Also “moderate” Christian are presented with divisive tendencies through the usage of 
stereotypes of the “other”. The “other” is here depicted as a rich, corrupt, Muslim editor. 
Under this “stereotype” we are given the perspective of the Christian response to allegations 
of President Jonathan's “unfair” victory. Mr. Osuchukwu insinuates that the “likes of you”, 
meaning the editor, is rich and corrupt: 
 
“You are only trying to fuel the crisis which the likes of you initiated in the first place. But the 
game is up for you, what remains is for you to go and hide your face in the shame, as for me 
yesterday will be the last day I will as much as take a look at the rag u call newspaper. When 
the likes of you send your children to good schools and encourage the poor ones to doom 
theirs to almajiri in this time and age. Your problems are right there at your nose leave, 
Jonathan and politics out of it” (Abubakar 2011a: 64). 
 
Under this “stereotype” we are given the perspective of the Christian response to allegations 
of Jonathan's “unfair” victory. Mr. Osuchukwu insinuates that the “likes of you” aka the editor 
is rich and corrupt as he send his own children to good schools while encouraging the ‘poor 
ones to doom theirs to almajiri
2’.  
Another online response to the allegations of the President’s “unfair” victory, suggests that the 
                                                          
2
 “Almajiri” is Hausa for : 1. A disciple, pupil, scholar, or 2. The commonest name for a beggar of mendicant 
(Bargery dictionary). 
53 
 
newspaper is biased: ‘Daily Trust after all is owned by a Katsina man who obviously will 
support Buhari whether good or bad’ (Abubakar 2011a: 64). The online response suggests that 
the owner of the newspaper belongs to the “other”, to a group who will support Buhari even if 
he is behind “bad” things. The author of the online response draws on a chain of assumptions 
and stereotypes. First of all Daily Trust is based in Abuja, which belongs to the geo-political 
“North”.  Secondly the owner is ‘a Katsina man’ –from Katsina, also in the “North”. He is 
therefore expected to support Buhari who is also representing not only the “North”, but the 
“Muslim North”.  Because of his position and expected attributes of it, the owner of the 
newspaper is labelled the “other” in this online response. 
 
  
4.4.3 Conclusion “moderate” elements 
As we have seen the “moderate” elements can be classified into three main positions in which 
the first consists of elements that are against division because of more secular (or neutral) 
arguments such as democracy and development. The second position consists of religious 
leaders sharing religious arguments emphasising equality and common traits, with places of 
worship as the preferred channel for communicating this message. The third position consists 
of elements that are “pro-division”, or who share a less tolerant message allowing negative 
attitudes come to the surface through stereotyping.  The three positions are shared by both the 
“Muslim” and the “Christian” camp. This sub-chapter too illustrates the complexity of 
ethnicity and group belonging in Nigeria as boundaries tend to overlap whereas stereotypes 
present attitudes towards identities that have fixed boundaries or characteristics. Political, 
regional and ethnic affiliations tend to overlap and are expressed through stereotypes of 
identities. These are however only stereotypes as there are not only one single overlap, but 
rather a complex and dynamic system of affiliations. A person from the “North” does not 
necessarily vote for Buhari and pray in the Mosque. Likewise, a person from the “South” does 
not necessarily have to be a Christian and vote for President Jonathan. In the next sub-chapter 
I will give an outline of different Nigerian leaders as depicted in the media.  
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4.5 Nigerian Leaders 
“Nigerian leaders” is a position made up of politicians, traditional and religious leaders, other 
important voices, and the elite(s) who to a certain extent encompass the former categories of 
Nigerian leaders. The aim for this sub-chapter is to illustrate how this group of Nigerians are 
being described in the newspapers by other Nigerians. I am thus offering a public description 
of these elements. The descriptions are based on editorials, columns, and various responses 
from readers -online, letter-based, or SMS. I have selected responses from different social 
strata. As mentioned to begin with, I have identified the following categories: The elite, 
politicians, religious/traditional leaders, and other important voices. Other important voices 
include religio-political personalities of different organisations and forums. These categories 
are however not that clear-cut as religion and politics often are fused. Despite the blurred 
boundaries of the two spheres of religion and politics, I seek as far as possible to address them 
separately. I choose to do so for the sake of further analysis relating to the research questions 
on the dynamic of religion, politics, and identity in Nigeria. Religious, political, and regional 
affiliations tend to overlap and while giving an overview of media depictions of Nigerian 
leaders, there are some positions that are more slippery to place than others. These “slippery” 
positions are what I have labelled “Religious and Traditional leaders”. Traditional leaders may 
be political or religious leaders, they are somehow in between as they do not follow modern 
“rules” for political structures. Traditional and religious leaders are therefore treated together 
before I move on to an overview of how the media presents political leaders. I will mainly 
focus on how political leaders are reported to be the “blame game”, in which the goal is to 
make the “other” leader or political party look bad either through insinuations of intolerance 
or allegations of corruption. The focus will also be on how the media presents other 
“common” or ordinary Nigerians’ view of political leaders. I start by presenting “Religious 
and Traditional Leaders”. 
 
 
4.5.1 Religious and Traditional leaders 
State Commissioner for Health and Environment, Dr. Nwangele Sunday ‘told newsmen that 
the youths of the area were angry because the Reverend Father was preaching politics’ and 
therefore the youths or the “thugs” targeted a local church in Ebonyi. The thugs were believed 
to be ‘overzealous PDP youths’ (Sobechi 2011: 15). Religion can therefore be seen as a very 
important aspect of identity. It is an important aspect given its function as marker of identity 
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and can stir up a lot of strong feelings if challenged, as in the case above. The media present a 
trusted religious leader who crosses the line in terms of religion and politics and further 
reports how such acts might stir up such strong emotions linked to identity. 
 
 
Serving two masters 
Religion can also be an important aspect of politics and vice versa. For example, it is quite 
common to use religious leaders in adverts for politicians, especially during the election 
campaign: ‘Muslims vote wisely (…) Our SHEIKS endorse GOODLUCK JONATHAN. Vote 
GOODLUCK for ISLAM don't be deceived. By Concerned Northern Muslims’ (The 
Guardian 2011b: 93). This advert is pro-Jonathan, and thus also somehow pro-PDP and pro-
Christian which might underline the already existing tension between religion and politics. It 
also underlines the pressure on religious and traditional leaders, such as the Sheiks, Emirs, 
and Sultans, as this might trigger off anger within more extreme circles such as Boko Haram 
where Christianity and secularism are presented as birds of a feather (See ch.4.2 on “Boko 
Haram”). The challenge does however play both ways as in the following case where the 
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) question the political party  ACN's choice of a 
Muslim leader in the South: 'The group during a meeting with the ACN candidate queried his 
choice of a Moslem as his running mate. Most of the members of the group have started 
campaigning against the ACN on the ground that a Christian dominated state like Benue 
should not have a Moslem in the Government House' (Nwakaudu 2011: 10). 
 
In the “media-scape”, the otherwise revered traditional leaders were reported to be under 
severe attacks by “extreme” elements following the announcement of the election results. It 
was stated in an editorial in Daily Trust that there was a ‘huge disenchantment [of traditional 
leaders] that made it possible for such frontal attacks on even symbols of traditional authority’ 
(Jega 2011: 33). According to the authors
3
 of Weekly Trust’s cover story “Why Northern 
masses rose against leaders”, the disenchantment was rooted in a view of these leaders 
playing a political game conniving with politicians in order to “eat their cake and have it too”. 
Politicians were further presented to use Islam for this cause given that Islam prescribes 
Muslims ‘to respect their leaders irrespective of how they arrived at the threshold of 
leadership and irrespective of how they are governed’ (Ibrahim et al. 2011: 3-4). A command 
that ‘has been abused by both traditional and political leaders as they conspire to under 
                                                          
3
 Written by Hussain J. Ibrahim, Solomon Chung, Abuja, Ibraheem Musa, Kaduna, Aliyu Mohammed Hamagan, Gombe, 
Ahmed Mohammed, Bauchi, Yusha’u A. Adamu, Jigawa, Lawal Ibrahim, Katsina & Yahaya Ibrahim, Maiduguri 
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develop the people' (Ibrahim et al. 2011: 3-4). Upon finding out ‘how politicians in 
connivance with some powerful people used monetary inducements to get the voters to vote 
in a particular direction, especially in the rural areas of the north’ (Jega 2011: 33), the position 
of traditional rulers was made weaker and the anger of the protesters more fierce. 
 
 
4.5.2 Political leaders 
The government, the elite(s), and especially politicians are reported to have been given the 
blame for the violence in the period of the presidential election. The political system as a 
whole is presented in the media as distrusted by commoners and politicians through 
allegations of conspiracy, violence, and corruption. Politicians somehow contribute to the 
negative image as they are reported to take part in the “blame game” and by depicting their 
opponents as the “other”. In other words they transfer the blame onto other political 
individuals or groups while elevating themselves. 
 
 
“Blame game” 
‘The acts of violence are crimes against society (…) Our party has been preaching peace in 
line with our motto which is Peace and Progress’ (Alao 2011: 13). Politicians who are blamed 
by the people for the problems occurring in the aftermath of the elections, preach peace and 
tolerance while blaming opponents for breaking this peace or of cheating: ‘Different 
unsavoury acts are perpetuated where the PDP constitutes the government (…) Threats of his 
[The former state governor] life and failed attempts to actually kill him are widely reported by 
the mass media’ (Alao 2011: 13).  The following incident of election violence in Bauchi 
serves as a fairly good example of politicians’ blame-game. The caretaker committee 
chairman of the CPC in Bauchi, Alhaji Aliyyu Sa'idu, said on one hand that ‘the crisis was 
allegedly caused by youths who said they were out to protect their votes’ and that ‘...the PDP 
connived with electoral officials to reduce the number of ballot papers’ (Mohammed 2011b: 
3).On the other hand, the state Publicity Secretary of the PDP, Sani Al'amin Mohammed, 
‘accused the CPC of hiring thugs from outside the state to intimidate people and prevent them 
from voting the candidate of their choice’ (Mohammed 2011b: 3). Based on these media 
presentations, politicians can be seen as contributing to ordinary Nigerians’ negative 
perception of them by blaming and accusing one another for acts of cheating, corruption, and 
violence.  
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Self-depiction 
In the media, politicians are outwardly humble and tend to use a good portion of religious 
rhetoric. Buhari's “plea to religious leaders” suggests that politicians try to portray themselves 
as humble while using God to amplify that humbleness and their philanthropic nature:  
 
‘It is my candid view that we as a people have reached a stage where our religious leaders 
cannot afford to maintain neutrality in terms of offering guidance to their followers and flocks 
in deciding who governs them in the April general elections, in which I am humbly offering 
myself to lead with uprightness, passion for service, and the fear of God’ (The Guardian 
2011c: 66).  
 
Both religious and political leaders make use of big words and especially political leaders. 
They do not however, only make use of these “big” words, but also neutral words in their 
rhetoric, like “God” rather than culture-specific names like “Allah” or “Jehovah”. The usage 
of religious rhetoric will be examined more closely in ch.5, but also accounts of the “other” 
which I only briefly present here. 
 
 
Accounts of the “other” 
Strong imagery like “saviour” vs. “evil” or “tyrant” is not uncommon. Barrister Oronto 
Douglas state in an interview that he views President Jonathan as ‘a pen in God's hand which 
He the Almighty, is using to bring justice to all Nigerians whether we are from the North, 
South, East or West’ (Bissala 2011: 53), thus suggesting that Jonathan is the “saviour”. 
Jonathan is however also depicted as a “tyrant” from a different political position: ‘We must 
treat them as leaders not rulers, and make them accountable to us for all their promises. No 
need replacing one set of tyrants with another' (Abubakar 2011b: 64). The response from this 
Daily Trust columnist insinuate that all PDP-leaders are tyrants who won the election by 
fraud: ‘I am ashamed and angered that for the next eight years I shall be governed again by 
the PDP based on a very fraudulent election’ (Abubakar 2011b: 64). In the media, it appears 
that it is not only politicians, but “commoners” as well who take part in the “blame-game”. 
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 Commoners blame the elites and the politicians 
As mentioned earlier, in the media the Nigerian elite(s) and especially the politicians are 
blamed for the violence in the aftermath of the presidential election. I present three different 
statements by “commoners” or ordinary individuals who blame the position of “Nigerian 
leaders” for the post-election crisis. The first one is Pharm. Harvey Igho Akpogamu who 
blames Nigerian leaders because ‘they use thugs as weapons when they do not win elections. 
As the popular saying goes, a hungry man is an angry man this shows how the poor masses 
can react towards a failed leader who fails to fulfil his or her promise.’ Example number two, 
Mrs. Peace Igho, suggests that it was the pride of the political leaders: ‘As for the post 
election crises, it was caused by political and religious leaders. The political leaders who 
refused to accept defeat use the youth in the country to cause violence’ but also the religious 
leaders ‘who preach to their followers that they should vote for people of the same faith are to 
be blame.’ Mrs. Bukola Mohammed, example three blames political leaders ‘because they use 
the youth as thugs to cause the post election crises that is happening.’ She also adds that 'most 
of the illiterates need to get political education.’ (Timothy 2011: 53). The media-position of 
Nigerian leaders, both religious and political, is thus presented as corrupt, untrustworthy, and 
the blame of the post-election crisis by ordinary individuals. 
 
 
Conspiracy 
Apart from “commoners” or ordinary individuals, editorials also present it as the fault of the 
politicians, while claiming that there are rumours of a conspiracy in which the Northerner is 
squeezed out: ‘The conspiracy goes that a southerner on the seat of presidency is going to 
work to ensure that the northerner is further pauperized and disenfranchised from the Nigerian 
State and the northern politicians working with Jonathan are only concerned about (…) 
welfare and better good of their own people’ (Jega 2011: 33). It is also presented as the fault 
of the politicians due to ‘the campaign mode of some politicians who resort to use religion, 
tribalism’ but also the electorate's ‘lack of awareness’ as ‘they [the electorate] would instead 
go to a candidate that belongs to their religion or tribe even if the person of their choice is not 
capable of handling the affairs of the state’ (Badamasi 2011: 30). The presentation above 
suggests that politicians are not only blamed for political tribalism or ethnopolitics, a topic I 
will return to in my academic discussion in chapter 6. 
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Allegations of Corruption  
Another example of a general discontentment with political leaders, is the numerous 
allegations of politicians cheating, stealing and immoral behaviour. A response by one Daily 
Trust reader concerning the former governor of Taraba State, Rev. Jolly-Nyame exemplifies it: 
‘The big man himself (Nyame) was on top of things stealing directly from the till. The money 
was mostly wasted on women, wine and revelry.’ The governor is not only a politician, but 
also carries the title “Rev.” meaning he is a Reverend, making the allegations of immorality 
an ever harder blow:  ‘Awilo, the Congolese's Makossa Crooner, got his own share. So were 
artistes like Hausa movie actor, Sani Denja. Prostitutes from neighbouring states found the 
regime also helpful. The governor was their saviour who found ways to end their poverty’ 
(Lau 2011: 31). The irony of using “saviour” here underlines the double standard perceived by 
the reader both in terms of religion and in terms of responsibility connected to political tasks 
such as providing socio-economic development for all. Political leaders also do what they can 
to increase the notion that other political leaders are corrupt and not to be trusted by claims 
and allegations. The following statement is dated before the election, where Buhari tries to put 
Jonathan in a bad light. In an online reaction to the claim by Buhari to Jonathan “I have never 
stolen public funds” the ball of distrust is tossed back to Buhari by Awwal Kako: ‘Buhari can 
say that to his people in the north. He cannot deceive us in the south. As a military dictator, I 
can say that he cannot beat his chest and say he never stole a kobo from the government. We 
refuse to be deceived. Period’ (Kako 2011: 29). 
 
 
4.5.3 Summary 
This statement summarize the general notion towards political leaders: ‘What seems to matter 
to politicians is the inordinate urge to capture power and secure offices from which they can 
loot public funds and enrich themselves through further means of corruption’ (Asemota 2011: 
79). Nigerian leaders are presented as untrustworthy, greedy, and corrupt by ordinary people 
and other politicians. In addition to this, their rhetoric is what I argue makes them appear as 
chameleons. In a way they are somehow found in between the “extreme” and the “moderate”.  
They are capable of taking many shapes and colours; they can praise themselves and their 
party, preach for peace, unity and the love of “God”, but also devalue, and blame their 
opponents for the wrongs in society. I will return to this argument in chapter 5 “Rhetoric of 
Unity” and in chapter 6 while discussing my findings. 
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4.6 Conclusion Nigerian positions 
The aim for this chapter has been to present and describe my data, consisting of newspaper 
texts and excerpts. I have presented four different "positions" that Nigerian media use in their 
coverage of Nigerian politics and established a typology of these media-positions. My aim has 
also been to illustrate the attitudes towards identity that I render key to answering the research 
questions regarding the dynamic of religion, politics and identity.  The four positions contain 
the most extreme and perhaps most specific group Boko Haram, the (less) extreme, but 
“misguided” elements, then “moderate”, and last “Nigerian leaders”. Apart from Boko Haram 
the other positions have representatives from both sides of the religious divide. This does, 
nevertheless, not mean that there is a clear-cut divide of ethnic boundaries. My aim has 
therefore been to illustrate the complex group formations in Nigeria as depicted in my 
material by voices in the two Nigerian newspapers. By so doing I hope to have provided a 
thorough introduction to the data material, but also the necessary background for the analysis 
in chapter 5 that I will address in a moment. 
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5. Discourse Analysis of the “Rhetoric of Unity” 
5.1 Introduction 
Before and after the Nigerian presidential election 2011 acts of violence were reported in the 
media. I set out to study newspapers from this period in order to answer my research 
questions regarding the relationship between attitudes towards ethnicity (ethnic and religious 
identities) and the dynamic of religion and politics. My research findings suggest that the 
political discourse is coloured by the usage of – and subscription to certain key elements 
which include “unity”, “justice”, “democracy”, “development”, and “equality”. These 
elements can further be regarded floating signifiers (see ch.3) given that contents ascribed to 
them by members of the political discourse differ. My aim for this chapter is to establish that 
actors in the discourses make active use of the politically correct “Rhetoric of unity” to signal 
who is “in” and who is “out”. Politicians, prominent people, and leaders in general, as well as 
“ordinary” individuals make use of the rhetoric arguably to obtain their goals, either political 
or economic. “Users” of the rhetoric make use of “presumed identities” to strengthen 
ethnocentrism and to present their own constructed reality in which the “I” and the “we” are 
opposed to “them”, “those”, and the “other”. An important point is that though politicians and 
other traditional and religious leaders, and the elite in general may be more skilled in the 
usage of the rhetoric, that the instrumental usage takes place across the social strata. 
Politicians and others in the political discourse may knowingly or unknowingly make use of 
the different identities or group memberships both as a weapon and as a shield. The rhetoric is 
used to express unity, but also antagonisms of political and regional nature.  
I will first give an outline of what I term the “Rhetoric of unity” with examples from the 
period before the presidential election and the political campaign and from the post-election 
period. My main emphasis will be on President Goodluck Jonathan, but I shall also account 
for how Buhari and other political personalities and “commoners” play on this rhetoric. The 
instrumental usage can, in my view, exacerbate the tension between groups by downplaying 
or denying that there is a problem and by covertly playing on those very fractions. I will 
exemplify my claims with cartoons and excerpts from Nigerian newspapers. Through 
analysing the excerpts I will be able to show how actors from different positions use words, 
images, and metaphors. This is important to demonstrate how this usage contributes in the 
making and reshaping of group identities. It is also very interesting to note how the language 
is rich in images that convey strong meanings and how opinion holders can say just about 
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“everything” without really “admitting anything”. The actors use the discourses to “hide” 
information by conveying meaning “between the lines” in cartoons and metaphoric language. 
I will divide my analysis into two main parts. In the first part I will delve into the issue of who 
is “in” by definition of the “Rhetoric of Unity”, more specifically how the different actors 
make use of key elements or “signs” within the discourses. My focus will also be on how 
these actors while sharing the usage of these, may have different conceptualisations of them 
or may attribute different properties to them. In the second part I will attempt to highlight 
certain “cracks” or alternative usages of the “Rhetoric of Unity” to create antagonisms and 
“out-groups”. The out-grouped are depicted through metaphors and images and made take on 
the role as the “other”. 
 
 
5.2 “Rhetoric of unity” 
I will now introduce what I choose to refer to as the “Rhetoric of unity” in which there are 
certain elements that “all” seemingly agree on as long as one does not discuss the contents. 
Having introduced the “Rhetoric of unity” I will move on to a short overview of my analytical 
tool; discourse-theory and explain how this rhetoric within the political discourse will be 
analysed. It is evident from the 2011 presidential election campaign that both Jonathan and 
Buhari, but also other prominent people in the media's lime light, made good use of “correct” 
discourse by employing the “Rhetoric of Unity”. “Unity” is the key element and mantra of the 
“Rhetoric of unity” and can be based on two levels of religion. It can be based on membership 
of one particular religion, and simply the membership of religion in general or of being 
“religious”. An example of the latter type of unity is the multitude of “God” references in the 
discourse. “Unity” is also based on the shared quest for development, justice, prosperity, 
peaceful coexistence (harmony), equity, and last but not the least, democracy. There are 
however, different understandings of these elements, the last in particular. Though the 
elements are somehow interrelated I will structure my text by emphasising the elements which 
I see as overarching, namely “unity”, “development”, “democracy”, “equality”, and “justice”. 
These elements can be seen as “floating signifiers” which is described in chapter 3. The 
floating signifiers are elements or signs that different actors struggle to fill with their own 
contents in their own particular way. My aim is therefore to see how the different actors; 1) 
Buhari, 2) Jonathan, and 3) Other actors, struggle over the “ownership” of these signs and 
furthermore contribute to the “Rhetoric of Unity” within the political discourse. 
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PART I 
5.3 Buhari and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) 
I will now give an example of how Buhari contributes to the political-correctness discourse by 
usage of the key elements mentioned earlier. The illustration below was originally a 
newspaper-advert for Buhari and CPC from the presidential-campaign period. 
 
Illustration 1: “Plea to Religious Leaders” (The Guardian 2011c: 66) 
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5.3.1 Unity of religion, development, justice, and democracy  
Buhari emphasise the unity of religion, development, justice, and democracy. He links “right” 
religiosity, moral and religious values such as integrity, uprightness, honesty to development 
and progress. He thus presents an image where religion is the “solution”. The poster is called 
“plea to religious leaders” in which Buhari makes use of the “unity” element as in unity of 
religion and of being religious. My aim is to demonstrate how Buhari make use of the 
“correct” elements of the “Rhetoric of unity” by using religion as the main entry point.  
The “solution” it seems, is to unite in the kind of religiosity that the ‘great religions teach’, 
namely religions believing in ‘probity and uprightness’. Buhari further links religion to 
governance that these tenets should be implemented or “allowed” in ‘the way we run business 
of governance’. According to Buhari the inadequate development is caused by the lack of 
righteous politicians. He does not, however, explicitly mention the word “politicians”, but 
camouflage them as ‘those in the corridors of power’ who ‘do not lead by good example’. 
Buhari further describe these politicians as hypocrites by adding ‘though they profess faith in 
God’. These politicians do therefore not count as members of that group of Nigerians that are 
of the “right” religiosity -the “we” in this discourse. The ‘leaders who abhor what is right’ can 
therefore, if following the rhetoric of Buhari, be labelled the “sinners” when they ‘promote 
wrongdoings by omission or commission’. Buhari continue to play on the unity of religion by 
adding a quote from “The Holy Writ”, which one would expect was with reference to the 
Quran given his background as a Muslim. However, “The Holy Writ” here actually refers to a 
Bible passage, Proverbs 14:34. Buhari must have assumed that the readers of this poster 
already knew the passage as he only include the first part of the verse: ‘righteousness exalts a 
nation’. The second part of the verse accounts for the opposite scenario: ‘but sin condemns 
any people’. Buhari thus present us with an image of him and the righteous religious 
Nigerians on one side contrasted with the politicians in power on the other side. The 
unrighteous and the “sinners” are portrayed as causing the lack of development and as the 
reason why the nation is not “exalted” despite its potential.  
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5.3.2 Democracy, justice, equality, righteous leaders  
Buhari presents the reader with two scenarios: One in which the country is backward with 
unrighteous, hypocritical, and corrupt leaders; and the alternative “new Nigeria” without 
bribery, equal rights to employment, justice, and the right to religious freedom as ‘enshrined 
in our constitution’. After presenting the two scenarios, Buhari moves on to his plea to 
religious leaders. He call upon religious leaders to fulfil their duty of guiding their people as 
Nigeria has reached a certain stage where they cannot “afford” not to do so. He implies that 
religious leaders should “guide” or instruct people on how or on who to vote as ‘the future of 
Nigeria’ is at stake. The promise is that Nigerians will be rewarded by ‘the gift of a new 
Nigeria’ without corruption and with the right to freedom of worship. This reference to 
Nigerians’ rights and further references to the Nigerian constitution represents a desired 
equation mark between Buhari, the CPC and democracy. Buhari also mention the punishment 
of fundamentalists thus distancing himself from extreme religious activism as that of Boko 
Haram, but also defending himself as a person and the CPC from prejudice against extremist 
Muslims. By doing so he establishes CPC as a moderate party and attempts to undress the 
myth that CPC is predominantly Muslim-friendly. The statement ‘any form of 
fundamentalism that breaches public law and order (.) will be tackled with the severity such 
deserves according to law’ also refer to the elements of justice and equality as it is written 
‘any form’ of fundamentalism that is in conflict with the law. Buhari thus emphasise the 
elements of “unity”, “justice”, “equality”, “development”, and “democracy” from a moral and 
religious perspective. Religion is here offered as a solution given that it is the “right” type of 
religiosity, the one of Buhari and righteous Nigerians and not the one of those leaders ‘who 
abhor what is right’. It is interesting to note how Buhari refers to the righteous, to Nigerians, 
and to ‘those in the corridors of power’ he does not mention the words Christian, Muslim, 
PDP, Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, North, South and he furthermore signs with ‘Sincerely Yours in 
National Service’.  
 
 
5.3.3 Summary 
The aim for this sub-chapter was to illustrate how Buhari, the leader of the CPC follow the 
genre of political correctness and how he makes use of “Rhetoric of Unity”. The data suggests 
that Buhari's concept of the “unity” sign includes national and ethnic unity, but emphasises 
unity of religion. Correct religiosity is presented as the prerequisite for “unity”, “justice”, 
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“development”, democracy” and “equality”. The current state of things is presented as caused 
by the lack of the unity and righteousness Buhari claim to represent. He makes use of the 
political correctness genre by pointing out the “other” through images such as “those in the 
corridors of power”, rather than “politicians”. While communicating between the lines he 
attempts to establish links of equivalence between his own name and political party and the 
positive value of the key elements while establishing chains of difference (see ch.3.3.4) 
between the “other” and those values.  In the following sub-chapter the aim is to demonstrate 
how Jonathan and the PDP (People's Democratic Party) makes use of the “Rhetoric of Unity” 
and how the floating signifiers of “unity”, “justice”, “development”, democracy” and 
“equality” are conceptualised.  
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5.4 Jonathan and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)  
We have just seen how Buhari and the CPC emphasised the unity of religion and the need for 
righteousness and righteous leaders in order to acquire a democratic country with justice, 
equality, and development. My aim for the following passage is thus to present how Jonathan 
also makes use of the key elements as opposed to Buhari. What meaning does he ascribes 
“unity” for instance? Jonathan does emphasise unity of religion, but also relates this unity to a 
broader context. Whereas Buhari want change in terms of getting rid of bad leadership, 
Jonathan use “unity” to paint a rather glossy image of a united Nigeria with himself in the 
leading role.  
 
 
5.4.1 Unity of religion  
The illustrations below are adverts sponsored by the One Nigeria Coalition, promoting 
tolerance in terms of religious unity. It is my aim to show how Jonathan as well uses unity of 
religion and does so by using visual elements with Muslim connotations.  
 
Illustration 2: “One Nigeria” (The Guardian 2011e: 10, The Guardian 2011d: 30)  
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The creator(s) of the adverts above quite skilfully make use of religious symbols and 
traditional religious institutions to promote Jonathan and to team up with the electorate. We 
are given the impression that there is a connection or a “we-feeling” between Goodluck and 
Muslim leaders. The heading “don't vote along ethnic, religious lines” gives the readers the  
notion that Muslim leaders and Christian leaders, or leaders who are Christian, like Goodluck, 
are equal in terms of their shared quest for democracy There is thus an amalgamation of what 
Goodluck represent and what Muslim leaders such as Sheiks and Sultan represent. I therefore 
see this kind of campaigning as an attempt of bridging the two religious positions under the 
banner of “unity” an instance of political correctness. The Emir describes it as Jonathan's 
mission to become president and repeats twice that it is by the ‘Grace of God’. Under the 
heading “Emir prays for Jonathan” we can see some prayer beads, but not the Rosary used by 
some Christians. It is therefore unclear whether it is by Allah's grace that Jonathan becomes 
president or if it is by some shared notion of “God”. Religion is therefore used here to create a 
sense of unity based on a shared religious element. As Buhari did, so Jonathan plays on the 
unity of religion.  
 
 
5.4.2 Development  
The advert to the right, where the Sultan of Sokoto encourage the electorate not to vote along 
religious or ethnic lines is trying to elevate Jonathan over Buhari as the General once was 
reported of saying that Muslims should vote for Muslims -an attribute that people tend to 
remember. Jonathan is therefore better as he, or the advert, suggests that he is the person to 
‘move the country forward’ and as he ‘carry religious and traditional rulers along in the 
development of the country’, which the Sultan, according to the advert, think ‘never happened 
before for a President’. In the advert the Sultan moreover state that he believes there ‘can be 
no development without stability and there is no stability when there is chaos all over the 
place’. The Sultan thus draws a chain of equivalence between the traditional rulers (himself), 
stability, and development.  
 
 
69 
 
5.4.3 Unity of ethnicity  
Three days after the presidential election, Jonathan is 
displayed on a poster with the words “Wazobia thank you 
4 choosing Goodluck”. He is once again playing the 
“unity” card as   “Wa”, “zo”, and “bia” means “come” in 
Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo, respectively. After 
independence it was one of the suggestions when naming 
the current “Nigeria”. The idea was to choose a name that 
would represent the larger ethnic groups yet reflect the 
unity of “Nigeria”/”Wazobia”. Wazobia is still used even 
though it is not the official name. The effect of using it 
here is to underline once again the united Nigeria and to 
disprove or drown the ethnic tensions between these three 
groups in particular and their religious affiliations. To 
crown it all, he is wearing Hausa attire whilst smiling, 
communicating harmony, tolerance, solidarity, and 
peaceful co-existence.  
Illustration 3:” Wazobia” (Daily Trust 2011: 55)   
It is however interesting to note the paradox of the elite(s), traditional, religious, or political, 
encouraging the electorate not to vote along religious or ethnic lines while those are the exact 
measurements used in the political campaign. Both Buhari and Jonathan play on Nigerians' 
shared religiosity. Jonathan further (indirectly) plays on ethnic and regional affiliation by 
being their “ally” in terms of identifying himself with a minority ethnic group, namely Ijaw. It 
therefore appears that he is representing all of Nigeria, both the majorities and the minorities. 
One of the reasons why Nigeria was not called Wazobia, besides the fact that the colonial 
administration was against it, is that some ethnic groups not included linguistically in the 
name of the nation might have felt cheated. He was in that sense a very “correct” Nigerian 
presidential candidate. This is what I refer to as the “one Nigeria project” where aim is to 
portray a unified Nigeria and anyone trying to destroy this image, will as I shall illustrate 
shortly, be framed as the enemy of the democracy and unity.  
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5.5 Summary  
I have given examples of how politicians can make use of the different key elements or 
“floating signifiers” in line with the protocols of the “Rhetoric of Unity”. I have also 
demonstrated how both Buhari and Jonathan seek to connect their position to the elements of 
“unity”, “development”, “justice”, “equity”, and “democracy”, as they are often associated 
with positive values. Politicians and other participants within this discourse thus share the 
similarity of having membership in this group. Being “in” by using correct polite language 
and by sharing the usage of key elements, does not however necessarily mean that the 
different actors in the discourses share the same concept or application of those elements. For 
instance, the element of “unity” is slightly differently used by Buhari and Jonathan. They both 
emphasise “unity of religion” and present religious symbols of the counterpart like prayer 
beads and quote from the Bible. Yet, it is only Jonathan who really envisage the unity of 
ethnicity following the example of “when in Rome do as the Romans” by wearing a Hausa 
attire. Whether they only differ in terms of their understanding or if also in terms of the 
degree to which they indulge in the concept of “unity” does not however emerge clearly from 
the data. The floating signifers or key elements within the “Rhetoric of Unity” can also be 
used to “out-group”, to exclude both other members and non-members. In the following part 
two I will show how antagonisms and dichotomies are produced by different positions while 
within the protocols of the political-correctness discourse by using images, metaphors, and 
metaphoric language.  
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PART II  
5.6 Constructing the enemy  
Succeeding the presidential election there were acts of violence and protests against the 
results in which Jonathan and the PDP won. In the same manner that the politicians above 
struggled outwardly to associate themselves with the key elements, Jonathan and his 
supporters try to construct an enemy who is the exact opposite of what the PDP represents. 
Whereas the group “politicians” (see ch.4.5.2) are given the blame by commoners, politicians 
cannot blame ordinary people while staying within the protocols of the correct “Rhetoric of 
Unity”. Instead, they blame the vaguely defined group of protesters which they label so-called 
“misguided elements” (see ch.4.3). Whereas the protesters could somehow be seen as enemies 
of particular politicians or political parties, the “enemy” is portrayed not as an enemy of the 
PDP, but of a united Nigeria. My aim is therefore to show how politicians, in this case 
president Jonathan, can exacerbate antagonisms by the demarcating “in” and “out” groups in 
their rhetoric. Furthermore, to demonstrate how the president and other users of the “Rhetoric 
of Unity” employ key elements (“unity”, “justice”, “development”, “democracy”, and 
“equality”) through the genre of political-correctness to play on notions of identity, both 
national and sub-national, by indirectly unmasking the “enemy” or the “other”.  
Based on my material I will illustrate in the following paragraphs how metaphoric language 
and key elements are used to create “the other”, as opposed to the “we”. The antagonisms can 
be of political and regional nature and expressed across social spheres and classes. “The good 
guys” share the common determiners of being “Nigerians” and of being united against a 
shared enemy. I will divide the following sub-chapters into two sections where I name the 
first “Enemies of Nigeria” and the second “Nigeria as the enemy”. To begin with I shall 
demonstrate how the “enemy” or the “other” is presented as “youth” or “misguided 
elements”, as another “politician”, and another “part” of the country. Secondly I will show 
how the political construct “Nigeria” can be perceived as the “enemy”.  
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5.7 Enemies of Nigeria  
My aim for this section is to shed light on how politicians and the elite(s) in general, that is, 
political, traditional and religious leader and important personalities, make use of the 
“Rhetoric of Unity” to paint a black and white image. An image in which the Nigerian leaders 
themselves play the good guys, teaming up with “Nigeria” and “Nigerians”, against those of a 
different political opinion and/or regional affiliation. Furthermore I wish to present how the 
discourse can be wielded both as a weapon and a shield. The floating signifiers can be used in 
different ways constructing different views of reality. Therefore, they have the potential of 
being used as a shield against criticism, but also as a weapon by putting the blame on another 
group, hence making it the shared “enemy”.  
 
 
5.7.1 The “other” as “youth”  
The excerpt below is to illustrate how Jonathan and his supporters use the political-
correctness discourse to create dichotomies where the roles are “we” the “Nigerians” against 
“those youths”.  
 
'To all those youths who have been rioting in many states to protest the outcome of last 
Saturday's presidential elections, newly re-elected President Goodluck Jonathan handed down 
a stern warning this morning: Enough is Enough!' (…) “I will defend the right of all citizens 
to freely express their democratic choice anywhere in this country; to enjoy every freedom 
and opportunity that this country can offer without let or hindrance. I assure all Nigerians that 
I will do so with all powers at my disposal as President, Commander-in-Chief” 'The President 
described the current unrest as a reminder of the events that led to the Nigerian civil war of 
1967-70. He said the intention of the rioters and their sponsors was to frustrate next week's 
governorship and state Houses of Assembly elections (…).' “To those persist in sowing the 
seeds of discord, I say – You may hurt and bring grief to some innocent families momentarily, 
but you will never succeed in stopping our journey: a journey that will lead this country, by 
the grace of God, to emerge stronger, more prosperous and more united. A nation where the 
bonds of our common aspirations and goals will spur and re-energize our resolve towards 
greatness. A nation where our children from North and South, East and West will grow with 
hope and live together as brothers, sisters, and friends. Let us always remember that we are all 
part of a shared destiny.” (Shehu 2011: 4-5).  
73 
 
 
The “enemy” or the “other” is “those” who according to this text do not support or share the 
positive values of the key elements within the “Rhetoric of Unity”. The “other” is usually 
referred to as the “youth” or “misguided elements”. They are labelled “misguided” or 
“confused” as they work against the values of unity and democracy which serves as the alpha 
and omega of the so-called 'One Nigeria' project. On one side we are presented with the voice 
of the “we”, Nigerians who can be defined as democratic and patriotic towards the federation 
(see ch.5.3; 5.4). On the other side, we are presented with the “other” or “those” opposite of 
the “we”. They are opponents by trying to stop the “destined unity” of Nigeria. These are thus 
not presented only as enemies of the state and the Nigerian dream, the destined future and 
success of Nigeria, but also as “childlike”, “irresponsible” and “irrational” elements .The 
paternalistic categorisation of this group is better illustrated in the cartoon below.  
 
 
 
 
Illustration 4: “Baba Goodluck” (Weekly Trust 2011: 49)  
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5.7.2 Baba Jonathan  
In the illustration below we can see President Jonathan and Vice President Sambo wondering 
what to do with the “Nigerian youths”, here depicted as a baby. This illustration is to 
demonstrate how Jonathan and others make use of metaphoric language to shape identities or 
create images of the “other”. It furthermore, illustrate how Jonathan by using the metaphor 
“youth” for the protesters somehow belittle or redress the issue of ethnic tension. The use of 
these metaphors of “youth” and “baby” is a polite or subtle way to communicate that these 
elements are “childlike”, “irresponsible” and “irrational”. These elements are furthermore 
anonymous described only by their virtues and are therefore voiceless and moreover used as 
an instrument to criticize the rhetoric of other politicians.  
The use of a baby as a metaphor for Nigerian youths is to symbolise the view of them as 
arguably innocent, but also helpless, and in need of guidance just like the baby does as it 
grows. Jonathan can thus be attributed the role as the “father” of the nation. He speaks out 
against “irate youths” and their irrational acts whilst trying to pacify the “adults” or the 
democratic and “patriotic elements that they are the majority. The youths are simply 
“misguided”, disobedient and confused elements representing only a “part of the country”. By 
taking the role as “Baba Nigeria”, President Jonathan skilfully avoid the real problem by 
minimizing it to the issue of “ignorant youths”. By belittling the issue altogether he also 
defend himself and his political foes and by creating an “out-group” he also make use of the 
discourse as a weapon. That the “misguided elements” aka “youths” or “baby” are presented 
as innocent and irresponsible can also be seen as an instrument or weapon against other 
politicians. It can be a weapon as it gives the president an opportunity to shift the blame on 
them, that they somehow triggered the irrational actions by not following the protocols of the 
“Rhetoric of Unity”.  
 
 
5.7.3 The “other” as a particular “part of the country”  
The following excerpt exemplifies well how it is possible to say just about “everything” 
without really saying “anything” at all. President Goodluck’s aide on Research, 
Documentation and Strategy, Barrister Oronto Douglas was interacting with some journalists 
in Abuja, whereupon he was asked how he would react to the post-election violence that 
broke out immediately after the president's victory:  
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‘President-elect Jonathan comes from a part of the country that has consistently voted for 
national unity and togetherness. His brand of politics is one without rancour or bitterness. His 
public and private life speaks of and demonstrates peaceful co-existence. He is not an 
exclusionist and it is unfortunate that violence should erupt from a part of the country to 
sour the sweet of our democracy. This is the time to heal and not to kill. It is time for 
Nigerians to intensify the building of our country brick by brick as supported by the strong 
mortar of One Nigeria’ (Bissala 2011: 53). 
 
Apparently the electorate from one “part” of the country was consistently voting for national 
unity and togetherness while violence erupts from (another?) “part” of the country to damage 
“our (Nigerian?) democracy”. Whereas Jonathan points to “elements”, Mr. Douglas refers to 
“parts” of the country, thus insinuating that there is a part of the country that is pro-democracy 
and pro-unity, and that there is a part that is not -that is violent and unpatriotic. He further 
plays on the religious rhetoric and makes reference to Jonathan as the needed saviour of 
Nigeria. He does not however specify who or what qualifies for the label “Nigerian” or 
“Nigeria”. Upon being confronted by a journalist of Sunday Trust whether the post-election 
violence would not affect the glory of the President’s victory and with the allegations of 
rigging from the President’s opponents, Mr. Douglas reply the following: 
 
'Did you say “His victory”? No, no, no! This is not a victory for Jonathan. It is a victory for 
Nigeria and Nigerians(…) President Jonathan is a pen in God's hand which He the Almighty, 
is using to bring justice to all Nigerians whether we are from the North, South, East, or 
West.' (Bissala 2011: 53, my emphasis)  
 
By referring to Jonathan as a pen or a tool of God, he also plays on the religious landscape of 
Nigeria and the respect for “God” by both Christians and Muslims. Instead of answering the 
question concerning allegations of cheating he elevates Jonathan to God's vessel of justice to 
Nigeria, thus releasing him from trivial issues like rigging. It is interesting to note that while 
Barrister Douglas initially make hints of regional differences with respects to democratic 
inclination, he refers to President Jonathan as God’s tool to 'bring justice to all Nigerians 
regardless of geographic location. He moreover emphasise that Jonathan and himself are part 
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of the “we” of Nigerians and that it is “our” democracy. This excerpt is further helpful in 
illuminating the unwritten law or codex of leaders’ public speech, highlighting their own 
membership of “Nigeria”. It also highlights the “proper” democratic indoctrination by giving 
reference to Nigeria as one nation, peaceful conduct, equality along religious and ethnic lines, 
and the fruits of such indoctrination being socio-economic development.  
 
 
5.7.4 The “other” as a “Beast”  
The illustration “Of Beauty And The Beast” and the excerpt below is taken from the same 
newspaper column “SaturdayNotebook” in The Guardian, written by Felix Oguejiofor-
Abugu. What the author is doing here is that he, in a very polite manner, draws chains of 
equivalence between Buhari and “the Beast” and contrasts this “Beast” with its counter 
“Beauty” aka Jonathan.  
 
 
Illustration 5:  “Of Beauty And The Beast” (Oguejiofor-Abugu 2011: 11)  
 
'Suffice it to say, however, that this nonsense about one particular group every so often 
falling on the others, at the slightest provocation, and killing and maiming them and 
destroying their property with so impunity and careless abandon has gone on for far too long 
in this country and has just got to stop (…) There are civilized avenues to channel our 
grievances at any point in time and those who constantly send ill-educated youths to fight 
their hate wars must learn to take advantage of such channels (…) And yet, I must still appeal 
to the governors: do not let this beautiful exercise we have had so far be tarred any further. It 
77 
 
is obvious now that there are many out there, within and probably outside, who do not appear 
to wish us well (…) This whole thing is a trap, a well-choreographed plot by some separatist 
forces to tear down our buddingwall of unity based on equity, justice, and fair play and re-
erect that of oppression and ethnic bigotry and supremacy, which had been the core of our 
underdevelopment all these years. So, don't let us play into their hands. Like President 
Jonathan, let the polls be free, fair and transparent.' (Oguejiofor-Abugu 2011: 11, my 
emphasis).  
 
The role of “The Beast” is here attributed to Buhari, and ‘one particular group’ who 'at the 
slightest provocation' go killing and destroying properties of ‘the others’. The date is 23.April, 
about one week after the election in which President Jonathan and the PDP won and the voice 
of the author smacks of this. The tone carries certain arrogance and perhaps it is because of 
this arrogance from winning the election that the author exaggerates the means he use to 
describe the “other”. We are led to believe that there is a connection between this group and 
Buhari/CPC as the author makes further reference to ‘those who send ill-educated youths to 
fight their hate wars’. Politicians are frequently blamed for hiring political thugs to do rigging 
or to get back at the opponent (see ch.5.4.2). Given that President Jonathan is ‘free, fair, and 
transparent’ we can only assume that it is that other guy who is behind the “trap” or the ‘well-
choreographed plot’ trying to ‘tear down’ Nigeria's or “our” stronghold of unity. “The Beast” 
therefore represents the exact reversed mirror-image of “the beauty” or of Jonathan. Whereas 
Jonathan has raised a ‘budding wall of unity’ that is based on ‘equity, justice, and fair play’, 
Buhari and his ‘separatist forces’ will tear this down and take Nigeria back to a past of 
‘oppression and ethnic bigotry’ the core of underdevelopment. Buhari is commonly addressed 
as General Buhari with reference to his past as a military ruler in Nigeria in the 1980s, and 
this fact may be what the author is driving at while speaking of ‘re-erecting’ a wall of 
oppression and ethnic bigotry. “The Beast” aka Buhari/CPC, separatist forces, and ill-
educated youths, is an enemy of a united Nigeria, development, justice, and equity, who 
should learn to use “civilized avenues” to channels their grievances.  
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Illustration 6:  “Angry Northern mob v Corrupt politicians” (Daily Trust 2011: 32)  
 
This cartoon shows another side of the story. It illustrates a darker, rawer, and more realistic 
image than that of Jonathan's “correct” rhetoric emphasising “democracy”, “development”, 
“equity”, “justice”, and “unity”. I believe it is appropriate to ask whether the young angry 
man holding a club can be seen as a prime example of ill-educated youth or part of the 
“separatist forces” conspiring to tear down Nigeria's “budding wall of unity”. One may 
furthermore ask if this illustration represents the perspective of the “misguided” elements. 
 
 
5.7.5 The “other” as “such Nigerians”  
 
'On a general note, it is evident that many Nigerians, without prejudice to religious or ethnic 
affiliation, hate the political entity called Nigeria more than they actually love it. As this 
group ignores the realities of the present, the future of Nigeria similarly matters not to them; 
which is why such Nigerians tell so many “sweet” lies about a non-existent future (…) This 
misguided group of Nigerians rather prefers to win elections fraudulently and at all cost than 
lose honorably.(...) Custodians of our traditional institution similarly have their own share of 
the blame in the political dilemma from which the region currently suffers. They have ceased 
to be the voice of those they lead and have instead become puppets to some unpopular 
political office holders.' (Ndagi 2011: 39, my emphasis).  
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In the opinion section of the Nigerian national newspaper Weekly Trust (Ndagi 2011: 39), Mr. 
M.U. Ndagi claims that there is a group of Nigerians who actually ‘hate the political entity 
called Nigeria’. This group also lie and deceive others by giving an unrealistic view of the 
future. The author makes use of the key element “development” while presenting those who 
‘ignores the realities of the present’ and does not care about the future as a ‘misguided group’ 
of Nigerians who would win elections fraudulently and at all costs. Knowing that Jonathan 
and the PDP won the election and that Buhari and the CPC has accused them earlier of 
cheating, readers are in my view meant to believe that the President and his followers 
constitute an obstacle for the development of Nigeria. The President and his followers are 
presented as “such Nigerians” who lie about ‘a non-existent future’. It therefore appears as if 
he is trying to deal with the President and the PDP's usage of the “Rhetoric of Unity” 
presenting Nigeria as united under their banner. It is also interesting that as he is dealing with 
Jonathan's glossy picture he is somehow careful not to go completely on accord with the 
correct “Rhetoric of Unity”. To begin with he adds ‘without prejudice to religious or ethnic 
affiliation’ before he continues his mission. This might however be a double-edged sword, as 
to point to the fact that it is indeed with reference to a particular ethnic or religious group that 
he writes what he writes.  
In summary, it appears that Mr. Ndagi is criticizing President Jonathan's image of a future 
which is abundant of “milk and honey” where there will be unity, peaceful co-existence, 
development, and so on and so forth. He moreover extends his discontent to accuse “such 
Nigerians” of deceiving common people by telling their ‘sweet lies about a non-existent 
future’ out of selfish reasons as they do not really care about the future of Nigeria. By 
criticizing the President and the PDP of using the “Rhetoric of Unity” to deceive Nigerians, 
MR. Ndagi actually make use of the very same rhetoric himself. While demonstrating that the 
President and the PDP or “such Nigerians” are the enemies of Nigeria he simultaneously 
draws between the lines a picture of Buhari and the CPC as the opposite of “such Nigerians”. 
The text above therefore shares some similarities with the example of “Of Beauty and The 
Beast” as this text as well plays on the strings of conspiracy. A conspiracy in which there is a 
particular group of “such Nigerians” who is working against the welfare of the majority of the 
Nigerian people. In the following sub-chapters I will present an alternative way of 
establishing the “other”. In this alternative way, the “united Nigeria” presented earlier by 
General Buhari and President Jonathan is perceived as the enemy while opting for an 
alternative “unity”.  
80 
 
5.8 “Nigeria” as the enemy 
Seeing Nigeria as the enemy is an alternative way of establishing the “other” opposed to the 
“standard” way discussed in the previous section above. This alternative way is alternative in 
that it uses the key element of “unity” to somehow attack the “standard” or the “federal” way 
of viewing “unity”. It offers a critical perspective on the political situation in Nigeria, and 
criticism of what some Nigerians perceive as a “sugar-coated” truth and a forced “political 
marriage” or forced “unity”. As mentioned just briefly earlier, the “unity” element of the 
“Rhetoric of Unity”, is paradoxically, utilised by some to advocate for the division of Nigeria. 
We shall first see how Jonathan's “One Nigeria” project is perceived to be having cracks with 
reference to the “state of the nation” being divided into two. We will furthermore go into how 
the “Rhetoric of Unity” can be seen as a defence mechanism for politicians in order to avoid 
the discomfort of addressing the differences within the nation. Key elements such as “unity”, 
“democracy”, “development”, all carry positive connotations that most politicians would 
subscribe to. Understanding, interpretation and implementation of these will, however, differ 
and it is this difference which establishes the key elements as floating signifiers. 
 
 
5.8.1 Cracks -broken image  
 
 
Illustration 7:  “State of the Nation” (Daily Trust 2011: 31)  
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This cartoon can be seen both as a mockery of the President's “unity” project, but also as 
antagonistic towards the North as “misguided elements”. While holding an umbrella with the 
letters P, D, referring to the initials of his political party PDP, President Jonathan is hiding in 
a trench or behind some kind of fence. While the umbrella here serves as both a metaphor of 
unity and protection, the trench can further be associated with war, thus possibly referring to 
the Nigerian civil war in which the South (under the name of Biafra) fought the North. That 
the president here is waving cheerfully while hiding behind a wall whilst holding a PDP 
umbrella in his hand is adding both irony and disbelief to his concept of a Nigerian “budding 
wall of unity” and Nigeria’s “destined” success and prosperity. Jonathan thus appear to be in 
line with his own mantra, or even hiding under it, on his side of the fence whereas the North 
on the other side appears to be a war zone of some sort. It is also worth noticing the “crack” 
dividing the picture which underlines the title “State of the nation”. This cartoon thus 
exemplifies very well that there are “cracks” or fractures in the picture of a “united Nigeria” 
depicted by Jonathan in the run-up to the election.  
 
 
5.8.2 Nigeria as unrealistic 
The following excerpt from an opinion column in the Daily Trust (26.04.2011: 29) by Charles 
Dickson also address the “cracks” in Jonathan's “unity” image: 
 
'Biafra wanted to be free and independent. It affected the common people who were 
suffering endlessly. The battle failed and the problem was silenced (…) We have exhibited 
in the last few weeks again that there is a continued forced political marriage, which at best 
is simply co-habitation and it is not mutual, at least amongst the very wild poor and the very 
rich on top. Again our comments have shown that we are a symmetrically groups trying hard 
to find a melting pot other than soccer, corruption and neglect by those we call leaders. In the 
face on current political contestations we continue to sugar coat the truth in the presence of 
the stark reality, another of which is that as violence has raged over in the Northern part of 
the country, we are cursed with a leadership that has long lost grasp of the issues, whether it 
be Goodluck Jonathan or Bestluck Buhari. (…) We have continued to the same thing over and 
over again and expecting different results (.) A simple disagreement, one religion, sect, ethnic 
group is upset and we resort to arms and in few hours lives, properties and worship centres are 
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dispatched with military precision and then a curfew is declared and after few months we 
repeat the sequence' (Dickson 2011: 29,  my emphasis). 
 
In this letter of opinion the author start out with a reference to the civil war, how it was 
wanted by “Biafra” and made “common” people suffer. Whether it is the leaders of the Biafra 
or whether it is the Biafrans who made the common people to suffer by their selfish wish for 
independence is however not stated clearly. The interesting point he is making here is how the 
‘problem was silenced’ after the battle failed. I argue that this silencing is usefully analysed as 
similar to what Jonathan was trying to do in his inaugural speech in response to the post-
election violence when blaming the “misguided elements”. Mr. Dickson draws a parallel to 
that event while demonstrating that this “silencing” of the problem is the pattern and the 
protocol of the rhetoric politicians abide by. He further underlines the insignificance of 
pointing fingers at particular political parties, since it is more of a general trend to make use 
of the “Rhetoric of Unity” to ‘sugar coat the truth’. According to this author the situation will 
remain status quo and “the sequence” will be repeated.  
 
 
5.8.3 Kicking out the bed-wetter 
In the article “Ha! My Cousin Is A Bed-wetter”, (Ogunsola 2011: 12) the title is applied in 
this text as a metaphor of the relationship between the “South” and the “North”, where the 
“North” represents the cousin who is bed-wetter. By wetting his bed, the “cousin” is bringing 
shame and uncleanliness to the house, meaning Nigeria. The author, Mr. Ogunsola, is using 
two voices. He applies italics where he talks of his “family matters” and the standard font 
where he discuss the current situation in Nigeria. Mr. Ogunsola draws a link between the 
smell of the urine and the blood, between the bed-wetting and the blood-letting. Wetting your 
bed is shameful, similarly as the world is watching the blood-letting in the North is also 
shameful in that it gives Nigeria a bad name as ‘visitors avoid our room’. 
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Illustration 8:  “My Cousin is A Bed-Wetter” (Ogunsola: 2011: 12)  
 
In text as well, there is an element of conspiracy as the author points to how the BBC Hausa 
Service journalist ‘allegedly announced figures that did not originate from the body 
authorized to do so, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) - and thus 
sparked the protests’. The conspiracy also include foreigners as ‘No one familiar with the wily 
ways of the West would rule out the possibility of a plot by foreign interests to scuttle what 
they would be a new era of peace and progress in our country. Never mind what they say in 
public. Remember Wikileaks.’ He further goes on to exemplify his conspiracy theory in his 
metaphorical account of his cousin: ‘But some strangers of questionable motives, non-
members of our family, insist that we share the same bed. Why?’ Mr. Ogunsola thus suggests 
that it is some foreigners, some agents of “the West”, who is threatening Nigeria's era of 
peace and progress by preventing a desired break-up between the South and the North. 
His arguments for the break-up is that in the “South” people are more civilized because they 
do protest as well, but they never ‘slaughter harmless mallams in their midst’. He further 
draws equation marks between “Northerners” and “Muslims” and between “Southerners” and 
“Christians”: ‘Babangida, a northerner annulled a free and fair election won by Chief M.K.O. 
Abiola, a southerner, there were protests. Yet nobody went about killing Moslems or 
Christians or Mallams (.) Any such act would be roundly condemned by the southern 
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populace’ He is also arguing that Christians are better than Muslims as the Christian clerics 
seek their political ambitions through “misguided elements”, but do so in a different manner 
as it ‘rarely involves manipulation for physical violence’. Furthermore, the “cousin” aka 
Muslim, and Northerner, is a hinder for development and progress. Though he has ‘his good 
points’, it is ‘hardly attainable’ to get ‘progress, development, good health, etc.’ in the 
‘present state of things’. He therefore argues for the separation of Nigeria and the exiling of 
his “cousin” by relocating him to the extent that ‘he would need a visa to glimpse me’.  
Mr. Ogunsola make use of the key elements “unity” and “development” to express his 
antagonisms towards “Northerners” while sticking to the protocols of the political correctness 
genre. He points on one hand to how Northern leaders make use of hordes of easily 
“misguided” youths and on the other an example of Christian clerics in the South. Yet, he 
point also to the “fact” that the “Northerners” are an obstacle for the development. His usage 
of these elements is another illustration of how the key elements are floating signifiers which 
differ in conceptualisation and implementation depending on the actor and his or her agenda. 
The “unity” the actor in this discourse have in mind is thus in stark contrast to the “unity” 
envisaged and advocated for by President Jonathan, and to that of Buhari.  
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5.8.4 The usage of key elements as weapon and shield 
 
 
Illustration 9: “Fair election” (Sunday Trust 2011: 28)  
 
Following accusations in the media regarding the election being fraudulent, President 
Goodluck Jonathan has according to an article in Daily Trust ‘dismissed media reports 
suggesting that his election was made along religious lines with the “Muslim North” voting 
against him and the “largely Christian South” voting for him' (Shehu 2011a: 3). Moreover, 
Prince Chibudom Nwuche deputy co-ordinator of the President's campaign in the south-south 
stated the following to the Daily Trust: 
 
'Jonathan's victory should therefore unite and not divide the country, noting that the violence 
which erupted in the northern part of the country was regrettable. “The fact that President 
Jonathan obtained over 25% of the votes cast in 33 states of the federation shows that he 
indeed enjoys a truly national mandate freely given by all sections of the country cutting 
across the North, South, East, and West” (Gusau 2011: 20 , my emphasis). 
 
The CPC and it adherents has on a multiple of occasions accused the PDP of cheating (see 
ch.4.3.2; 4.5.2). If that is the case that the PDP did cheat it would indicate that they did not get 
the united support they claimed to have received. In President Jonathan and his fellows' 
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defence of the cracks in the envisaged image of “unity”, they once again underline that he is 
truly a man of the people in line with their unifying nationalistic ideology. I find it slightly 
conspicuous to continuously be stressing the need for unity and brotherhood. It makes me as a 
reader makes me suspect that he is not having such a strong role as a unifying force as in the 
image we are initially presented with. In my view, the firm insistence on such qualities is only 
contributing to the confirmation and reinforcement of already existing demarcations. As the 
attention is taken away from the issue of ethnic conflict by pretending that there is none by 
“silencing it” one allow the “sequence” to repeat itself. While politicians fight to be the most 
“correct” in the political discourse they are avoiding to address the actual contents of what 
they claim to adhere to in terms of the “Rhetoric of Unity. It is this uncertainty or taboo-like 
condition I would claim is likely to only exacerbate the identity issue, but also the aspect of 
the shared key element that they adhere to are floating signifiers. The root to the perceived 
broken promises could spring out from the matter of subjects and politicians associating 
different values to the key elements of “democracy”, “development”, “justice”, 
“development”, and “unity”. For instance, Buhari underline the religious right to freedom of 
worship while Jonathan speaks of “democracy” as the right to freely choose to live where you 
want. That these elements or categories are so spacious is both their strength and their 
weakness and is perhaps why they can be used as both a weapon and a shield. In the rhetoric 
based on unity and political correctness, actors can use them to elevate one candidate, idea, or 
party, but also as protection against allegations, as suggested in the case of President Jonathan 
and his victory.  
 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
In part 1, I have established that there is a certain rhetoric centred on political correctness and 
the key elements of unity, justice, democracy, development and equality. “Unity” can be seen 
as the overarching element in the sense that unity of Nigeria can be regarded the main 
“project” of the politicians and other elites participating in the discourse. The usage of these 
key elements, also referred to as floating signifiers, differs between the different actors within 
the discourse. Whereas Buhari mostly emphasise unity based on religion, justice, and 
democracy, Jonathan emphasise unity based on religion, and (covertly) ethnicity, and 
development. Other politicians are however less discrete and in part 2 we have therefore seen 
how antagonisms are played out by these very same key elements. The usage of key elements 
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making up the “Rhetoric of Unity” can thus be seen as both a weapon and shield. Metaphors 
and metaphoric language is employed to create chains of equivalence as in the case of “the 
Beauty and the Beast” in which Jonathan is equalled with “The Beauty” and Buhari with “the 
Beast”. Such chains of equivalence can, however, simultaneously generate chains of 
difference by presenting the two as intrinsically different, where one represents the so-called 
“other” or “the Beast”.  
The main project of portraying a unified Nigeria has moreover an alternative interpretation in 
which the main project is regarded unrealistic. By communicating this message and the need 
for a break-up and change of the political entity “Nigeria” they still argue alongside “unity”. 
One may therefore suggest that they are advocating for a different type of “unity”. This 
demonstrates the point that there is a dynamic instrumental usage of the floating signifiers 
across the social strata, not only “top-down”. It has been interesting to note that though 
politicians agree on the “unity project”, and those against this project also agree on their own 
different type of unity project, they do not agree on the contents of their projects. Identity 
groupings are thus highly complex and fluid. Whereas Nigerians may agree on being 
Southerners and agree on the political act of “kicking out the bed-wetter” they may disagree 
on terms of religion or ethnicity.  
Actors within the political discourse may use the same key elements, but do not necessarily 
share the same opinions. The key elements are thus used to convey very different and 
antagonistic messages through metaphors. Between the lines there is thus a “correct” bullying 
going on, where one refers to certain “parts of the country”, or gives the “other” certain 
characteristics as to make sure that the “enemy” is known. I therefore suggest that the 
instrumental usage of the key elements has the potential for exacerbating ethnic tensions. The 
“Rhetoric of Unity” within the political discourse can be seen as political means of 
stigmatising the opponent; the individual or group not sharing one's political or religious 
views. The instrumental usage can also be harmful as it appeals to Nigerian stereotypes by 
playing on Nigerians’ attitudes towards one another. 
 
 
 
88 
 
6. Discussion 
6. 1. Introduction 
The overall aim of this chapter is to expand on the research findings in chapters 4 and 5 by 
engaging other scholars and previous research on the topic. My aim by doing so is to support 
and to show how my findings in this particular case can offer different knowledge or 
perspectives that may be of interest to the wider academic field. My research problem is 
concerned with the dynamic of religion and politics on the one hand, and the concept of ethnic 
identity on the other hand. While discussing the concept of ethnic identity in chapter 2, I 
argued for the emphasis on the political aspects of ethnicity and that ethnic and religious 
identities should be treated together under “ethnicity”. In chapter 1 “Introduction” I asked the 
questions “How does the dynamic of religion and politics affect and influence notions towards 
ethnic identities? How are ideas of “us” and “them” or inclusion and exclusion expressed? 
And what constitutes such ideas or attitudes?” I addressed these questions in the previous 
chapter (5) by means of discourse analysis. Analysing the data a pattern emerged in the 
political discourse that I have referred to as the genre of political correctness and the 
“Rhetoric of Unity”. Within the genre of political correctness and the “Rhetoric of Unity” 
there are certain unwritten “rules”. These “rules involve that one must subscribe to the usage 
of key elements; unity, development, democracy, equality, and justice, that again function as 
so-called floating signifiers. Based on my findings I have argued that this political-correctness 
discourse can be used as an instrument, by the elite and other actors in the media, both as a 
weapon and a shield. I furthermore argue that such instrumental usage has the potential of 
further exacerbating existing tensions by playing on Nigerians' attitudes towards one another.  
 
 
6.2 Presentation of research findings: a short summary 
Based on my findings, I suggest that there is a “Rhetoric of Unity” within the political 
discourse in which the elites and other Nigerians express their attitudes to one another through 
so-called “floating signifiers”. The floating signifiers contain certain key elements that are 
dominant in the political discourse and the “Rhetoric of Unity”, these include: justice, 
development, democracy, equality, and development. The political discourse thus becomes an 
arena in which various actors and representatives from across the social ladder can present 
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their attitudes towards other individuals and groups. Moreover, they present not only their 
attitudes towards others, but also their own image of reality and of themselves in terms of 
self-identification. Actors identify themselves and others by attributing people certain 
properties or characteristics.  
The key elements of the “Rhetoric of Unity” can be understood by using Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(see ch.3; Laclau and Mouffe 1990; Laclau 1993b) term "floating signifier". The meaning 
ascribed to the key elements by members of the discourse differs, but also the usage of them. 
One and the same key element can therefore, as in the case of “unity”, be used to exclude and 
include one and the same group depending on the various meanings or values attributed to the 
element.  I therefore claim that they can be used as an instrument by all its participants. The 
participants of the given discourse are both politicians in general, political leaders and other 
elites and commoners from one or more of the various group belongings; political, religious, 
regional, ethnic. The rhetoric can thus be used to mediate various grievances and negative 
attitudes towards other Nigerians and furthermore strengthen existing dichotomies. In this 
sense I see the instrumental usage of the rhetoric as having the potential for further 
exacerbation of existing ethnic tension by targeting notions of ethnicity and of belonging. In 
summary, my findings suggest: 
  
a) That there is an instrumental usage of ethnicity in the political discourse playing on 
notions of belonging and Nigerians’ attitudes towards one another.  
b) It is a “two-way usage”, meaning that it takes place across the social strata reflecting 
the background of the various participants of the “Rhetoric of Unity”.  
c) The usage, whether from one position or another can cause exacerbation of existing 
tensions related to ethnicity. 
 
 
6.3 Relating to the wider academic field 
Previous research on the dynamic of ethnic identity, religion and politics has been criticized 
by over-emphasising the instrumentalist argument and by focusing merely on the top-down 
instrumental usage of ethnicity (See chapter 2.5: 16-19). It has therefore been my aim to look 
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at how the dynamic can be used by various actors, not just the privileged hegemonic class 
often referred to as the elite(s).  My first priority has however been to focus on the role of 
expressed attitudes towards identity and ethnicity rather than actions or reactions to it. Based 
on the overview given in chapter 2, I will address how scholars on ethnicity in Nigeria view 
the dynamic. I will furthermore explore how their shared efforts highlight the ambivalent 
nature of ethnicity in terms of its functions and characteristics. Scholars’ efforts on the 
dynamic of religion, politics and identity, is often centred on the topic of “ethnopolitics” and 
often adopts an instrumentalist approach. Within the instrumentalist approach there is, 
nevertheless, some disagreement regarding the functions of ethnicity as scholars choose to 
emphasise different characteristics of ethnicity. A key aspect of ethnicity is mobilisation. This 
aspect is however ambivalent as it can be seen both as an obstacle and a primus motor for the 
realisation of the key elements of “unity”, “democracy”, “development”, “justice” and 
“equality”. Whether one has positive or negative inclinations towards ethnic mobilisation, 
thus rely on the individual or the group's conceptualisation and understanding of these 
elements. Ethnic, nationalist, and federalist positions will all view ethnicity according to their 
position's view on ethnicity and its relation to the key elements (see ch.2.4). My contribution 
to the dynamic in question and to the academic field can be listed in the following points: 
 
1) Examples from the Nigerian newspapers confirm that ethnic and religious identities 
are used in an instrumental manner which has the potential for exacerbating tension. 
2) The instrumental usage is dynamic and can therefore be seen as a two-way process. In 
addition to the elite(s) various actors take part in ethnopolitics through their 
participation in the “Rhetoric of Unity”. 
3) I suggest an alternative perspective; that in addition to the before-mentioned 
instrumental usage there is a meta-instrumental usage of ethnicity in the political 
discourse, in which politicians use other politicians’ participation in ethnopolitics as a 
weapon against them.  
4) I further address the disagreement within the instrumentalist approach and between the 
instrumentalist and essentialist views on (ethnic) identity and ethnopolitics. 
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6.3.1 Instrumental usage: “Rhetoric of Unity” 
I argue based on my research findings in that there is an instrumental usage of both ethnic and 
religious identities. Furthermore, there is also an instrumental usage of the intersection 
between religious and ethnic identities, further exacerbating existing tensions. The 
instrumental usage is moreover dynamic and I later argue that it is a tool which can be applied 
both from “above” and from “below”, across political, religious, regional, and social strata. 
The instrumental usage of “ethnicity” has been referred to and termed “ethnopolitics”, 
political tribalism, identity politics, or ethnic politics, by other scholars in this field. I stick to 
the term “ethnopolitics” in line with Nnoli (1978). The ethnopolitics in this case manifest 
itself in the instrumental usage of the political discourse in which the key elements of “unity”, 
“equality”, “justice”, “development”, and “democracy” are crucial. The dynamic of these is 
what I have previously referred to as the “Rhetoric of Unity”. The aim for this paragraph is to 
show how this rhetoric the political discourse can be used as an instrument by filling its key 
elements with different contents and thus creating different “enemies”.  No particular ethnic 
or religious group is targeted overtly, instead metaphors and metaphoric language is used to 
give away who the opponent or the enemy of “federal” or national unity is. The antagonisms 
draw on the different conceptualisations of “unity” which includes unity of religion, ethnicity, 
political views, regional affiliation, but also on the other key elements; justice, democracy, 
development, equality.  
The enemy is not presented as the traditional Muslim, Christian, Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba, or 
Ijaw, but rather as an enemy of the key elements by his or her classification as the “other”. 
The “other” can be classified through labels such as so-called “misguided elements”, 
particular “parts” of the country, or “separatist forces”. These labels can however be seen as a 
shaping and reshaping of group identities and an addition to existing traditional labels. This 
leaves us with a complex web of group alliances as the key elements are attributed different 
meaning and contents depending on the holder. “Everybody” thus agree that opponents of 
such concepts as “unity” and the other key elements ought to be rendered enemies of 
“Nigeria”. Who these opponents are again depends on the individual interpretation of the key 
elements. Even the term “Nigeria” is debatable as there are conflicting ideas as to the current 
“unity” of the federal state. Basically “everybody” agree and wish for a state based on unity, 
peace, harmony, justice, development and so on and so forth, but on different terms. Likewise 
“everybody” submit to the “correct” rhetoric, but for different purposes and to express 
different attitudes and opinions. I shall now compare and discuss my findings in relation to 
previous scholarship on ethnicity in Nigeria starting with Niels Kastfelt. 
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Relating to other scholars 
The nature of the key elements is underlined by Kastfelt’s view on the debate in Nigeria 
concerning the Nigerian constitution being opposed to or in support of Nigeria as a secular or 
religious state. He points to the different understandings of how this relationship ought to be. 
Whereas many Muslims opt for a religious state, Christians often argue that religion should 
remain on a private rather than a state-level (Kastfelt 1997: 44).  “Unity” can thus be regarded 
a sign which symbolises very different values and usages.  Religious and ethnic identity is, as 
mentioned earlier, dynamic and it appears that it has the potential of interfering with what 
values and contents a sign or key element is given. For instance, In Buhari's discourse in “Part 
1” he generally emphasise “unity” based on religion. President Jonathan emphasised religion 
as well, however, on religion as part of ethnic identity, illustrated by the attire he was 
wearing. Given the close ties between the individual or groups’ conceptualisation of the key 
elements and identity, the key elements can be used to express the “we” as opposed to the 
“other”.  “Unity” or other key elements can thus be used to include or exclude. For example, I 
demonstrated in “Part 2” how the current “united Nigeria” was regarded the obstacle for a 
different kind of “unity” in which the Northern part was not included. Based on this I argue 
that there is a tension between “unities” and thus also potential tension between users of such 
different “unities”. Ethnic, religious, regional, political, local, national, and federal unity are 
but a few mentioned by scholars (see ch.2). 
Jinadu’s (2002) state that the objective of Nigerian federalism is to pursue ‘diversity in unity’. 
While advocating for federal unity, the implementation of a “Rhetoric of Unity” is in fact 
threatening that very unity through the antagonisms provoked by classification and exclusion 
of groups. According to Jinadu (2002) the unity of the Nigerian federal state can be threatened 
by one ethnic group's perceived domination of other groups and the exclusion of the 
“dominated” groups from national or 'unit-level' government level  (Jinadu 2002: 2, my 
emphasis). Federal “unity” is thus threatened by the type of attitudes opting for a different 
unity based on the separation of the Nigerian state, but also the “dominated” groups. This 
supports my research as those elements presented as “misguided”, “youth”, or “baby” in the 
“Rhetoric of Unity” can be seen as dominated by being classified as such. Jinadu (2002) 
describes the current nation-state a flaw due to its 'partial or parochial and ideologized, 
unificationist, integrationist or assimilationist assumptions and thrust' (Jinadu 2002: 12, my 
emphasis). Jinadu thus insinuate that politicians do in fact make use of “unity” through their 
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‘unificationist assumptions and thrust’. According to Udogu (2001), political entrepreneurs 
often invoked ethnic solidarity for the sake of promoting their own interests (Udogu 2001: 
22). The “political entrepreneurs” thus make use of “unity” based on ethnicity. There are 
therefore, in my view, tensions between the different types and expectations of “unity”. The 
descriptions above thus serve to underline my claims of tension between different 
understandings, but also different usage and politics of “unity”. In the next section I will 
emphasise “ethnopolitics” and on how the instrumental usage of ethnic unity and solidarity 
should be seen as dynamic. 
 
 
6.3.2 A dynamic instrumental usage 
The ethnopolitical usage or manipulation of Nigerians’ attitudes towards one another is not a 
one-way project. I mentioned initially that actors in the political discourse in my data 
represent various groups from different religious, ethnic, regional, and political background. 
In chapter 4, I presented a typology of four Nigerian positions based on the depictions of these 
in the newspapers in my material. The three main positions include “misguided”, “moderate”, 
and “Nigerian leaders”. The issue of classifying troublesome Nigerians as “misguided” 
elements supports that there is an elite, or several elites on the top trying to manipulate people 
for the sake of their own interests. However, the data taken from interviews and opinion 
sections in the newspapers suggests that common Nigerians also participate actively in the 
political discourse and utilise the key elements for the sake of their own interests.  There is 
thus a tension between the interests of different Nigerian positions and thus also different 
understandings and usages of ethnicity. What is presented as an expression of democratic 
aspirations by some may therefore not be perceived as such by others. In the last section of 
Part II in chapter 5, “Enemies of Nigeria”, or those Nigerians describing Nigeria as the enemy 
where in fact exercising their democratic rights. Their democratic aspirations may not 
however be perceived as such by the “friends” of the current Nigerian state (see ch 5.8). 
Though the actors presented in chapter 5 are from different religious, ethnic, regional, and 
political backgrounds, I can unfortunately not claim that they are from all social strata as at 
least the opinion sections requires literacy on the account of the actor. Some of the Nigerians 
interviewed might however have been illiterates, but even at that they may not be able to 
engage actively in the political discourse. Furthermore, they may also not be given the chance 
to consciously make use of the discourse as there are limited ways for them to check that what 
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is written equals their own account. In that sense it is a possibility that those who are illiterate 
can be used by journalists or editors for the sake of the interests of the latter.  
In relation to previous scholarship, Ukiwo (2005) points to the fact that there had been studies 
in which the elite had responded to mass-expectations (Ukiwo 2005: 8). He does, however, 
not mention any scholars or the name of the studies conducted. Nevertheless, the data and the 
analysis in this thesis suggest that there is a “two-way” manipulation. As mentioned in chapter 
2, the instrumentalist approach has been critiqued of offering a rather reductionist or one-
sided view of ethnopolitics in terms of class struggle and manipulation of the masses (ch2: 
21). Vaughan criticise the tendency within the instrumentalist perspective to dismiss ethnicity 
as 'mainly mediums in which the political class seek refuge behind communal themes and 
symbols' arguing that 'confronted with the rapid decay of the Nigeria state in the 1990s a new 
generation of civic leaders are reconstructing ethnic themes as the medium for the articulation 
of not only communal but democratic aspirations' (Vaughan 2001: 80). Vaughan further 
underline that ethnicity can be used to mobilise groups in resistance to oppressive and corrupt 
regimes. Mustapha on the other hand regard ethnicity as an obstacle for democracy, viewing 
ethnic mobilisation or in his words ‘ethnic sectarianism’ a threat to the unity and democracy 
of Nigeria (Mustapha 2004: 257).  This supports that there are different opinions of what 
“unity” constitutes, but also that by using the political discourse actors can invoke ethnic 
solidarity based on the key elements (“unity”, “development”, “justice”, “democracy”, and 
“equality”). It also suggests that in addition to the two-way usage of both elites and “masses”, 
or common Nigerians, the discourse can be used to express different interests depending on 
the position. That does not, however, disprove that the elites manipulate the masses. It does 
open up for negotiations as the discourse becomes a democratic arena where one can express 
opinions as long as within the protocols of the “Rhetoric of Unity”.  
 
 
6.3.3 Meta-level 
In addition to the two-way instrumentalist usage of both mass and elite I would argue that the 
actors also use ethnopolitics on a meta-level. A usage in which one refers to the ethnopolitical 
game played out by other political actors within the political discourse. In “Part 1”, for 
instance, Buhari relate the inadequate development to unrighteous politicians. He does not, 
however, refer to them as politicians, but as “those in the corridors of power” and categorise 
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them as hypocrites by phrases like ‘though they profess faith in God’. This can be interpreted 
as the other politicians are using religion as an ethnopolitical tool, whereas Buhari and the 
CPC are the ones who actually subscribe to a rightful religious identity. By referring to other 
politicians' instrumental usage of religion, one can argue that Buhari and the CPC implement 
ethnopolitics on a meta-level. Similarly, President Jonathan and the PDP can be said to 
subscribe to such a meta-instrumental usage of ethnopolitics. While his classification and 
domination of the so-called “misguided elements” can cause exclusion of the “dominated” 
groups from national or 'unit-level' government level (Jinadu 2002: 2), it can as well relate the 
behaviour of these groups to the ethnopolitics of other political actors. By using metaphors 
such as “baby” and “youth” to describe the “misguided elements” these elements are stripped 
of responsibility due to their “childlike” and “irrational” behaviour, but as well used to 
criticize the rhetoric of other politicians. Buhari for instance talk of the need for religious 
leaders to “guide” the people in terms of voting and such kind of statements can be used 
against him as ethnopolitical rhetoric. 
 
 
6.3.4 Instrumentalist and Essentialist  
We shall now return to the tensions between the instrumentalist- and the essentialist approach, 
starting with instrumentalist underpinnings. The antagonisms and dichotomies communicated 
through the “Rhetoric of Unity”, political correctness and metaphoric language can as pointed 
out above be used for political goals by actors across the social strata. It can however, also 
arguably strengthen tensions as well as ease them given ethnicity’s ambiguous nature. Jenkins 
(2003) state that  categorisation can contribute to group identity through, among other ways, 
the process of 'internalisation' where the group being externally categorised assimilate bits of 
or the entire description into its own identity. (Jenkins 2003: 68). The expressed antagonisms 
and dichotomies can thus be regarded categorisation. This categorisation is in my view 
playing on existing attitudes, but can as well lead to the internalisation of new attitudes or 
ethnocentrisms between groups, but also negative attitudes towards the state.  According to 
Jenkins (2003) social identity is shaped and reshaped through an on-going process in which 
external or public images of the ‘self’ become incorporated. Drawing on Barth he claims that 
the ‘self’ consists of ‘I’ and ‘me’ where the ‘me’ is a ‘constellation of the incorporated 
attitudes and responses of others’ (Jenkins 2003: 63).  Jenkins’ view thus appears to support 
my claims regarding the shaping and reshaping of group identities. However, social identity 
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and ethnic identity is not necessarily the same as ethnicity. Ethnicity or ethnic identities can 
be seen as one of many sub-identities constituting the ‘self’. Social identity can be seen as a 
more general term for group belonging, whereas ethnicity tends to lend associations to a 
shared historic past, either real or imagined (see ch.2; Kastfelt 2003: 205). 
I see the instrumental usage of ethnicity in Nigeria as both dynamic and essential. Whereas 
ethnic or religious identities remain the same in form by the continuation of rituals and 
traditions and the manner in which these are expressed might change. In this sense ethnicity 
should be seen as having the attributes of being both dynamic and slow to change 
simultaneously.  I am therefore apprehensive of concluding that the instrumental rhetoric 
analysed previously shape or “create” new ethnic identities, but suggest that they reinforce 
existing tensions as suggested by Rudolph (2006) in the case of the civil war.  According to 
him the sitting regime used ethnicity as device by playing on existing tensions rooted in 
ethnic, religious, and developmental differences between the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo. (See 
Ch.2: 17;, Rudolph, 2006: 181, 186-192). Kastfelt (2003) suggests that ethnicity should not be 
viewed in exclusively constructivist and contextual terms. He introduces an alternative way 
opposed to the trend of stressing the historicity of ethnicity by drawing on Lonesdale’s 
distinction of ‘moral ethnicity’ and ‘political tribalism’ (Kastfelt 2003: 205). In his opinion, 
this distinction can offer a more ‘complex historical understanding of ethnicity’ (Kastfelt 
2003: 205). Moral ethnicity is defined as ‘…the common human instinct to create out of the 
daily habits of social intercourse and material labour system of moral meaning and ethical 
reputation within a more or less imagined community’ and political tribalism as ‘the use of 
ethnic identity in political competition with other groups’ (Kasfelt 2003: 205). Though I agree 
with Kastfelt that this distinction offers a more complex understanding of ethnicity I do not 
see how it counterfeits the instrumental usage of ethnic identity nor that this usage can be a 
positive as well as negative trait of ethnicity. That the two distinctions are named ‘moral 
ethnicity’ and ‘political tribalism’ leaves an impression of ‘good’ v ‘bad’ as ‘tribalism’ is a 
concept that often carry negative associations and that is often linked to the conflict aspect of 
ethnicity. In my opinion, ‘political tribalism’ or the usage of ethnic identity in political 
competition does not have to be negative. It is, in my view, relative to what the competition is 
about –whether it is about minority rights or whether it is the instrumental usage of such 
claims.  
I mentioned previously that various actors engage in ethnopolitics through the political 
discourse and that this can be seen in support of my claim that the instrumental usage is 
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dynamic. I also mentioned initially in this paragraph that I see the instrumental usage as both 
dynamic and essential. Though instrumentalism as a school of thought is opposed to 
essentialism it does carry some essentialist aspects. Stereotypes are somehow frozen 
descriptions of the “other” and are thus static. Stereotypes are typically concerned with the 
essence of a character or group and in line with Edward Said’s theory of “Orientalism” this 
falls under essentialism. The “other” is a construct and functions as the object which is 
opposed to the subject. The subject has positive characteristics whereas the object is made the 
negative “mirror-image” of the subject (Said 1978). Through the “Rhetoric of Unity” these 
antagonisms are often expressed via stereotypes or fixed ideas of the “other”. Actors within 
the political discourse may not shape new identities, but strengthen existing dichotomies and 
antagonisms by upholding a fixed or static perception of the “other”. The instrumentalist 
approach and the instrumental usage the “Rhetoric of Unity” and its key elements of 
“development”, “justice”, “unity”, “equality”, and “democracy”, can thus be seen as both 
dynamic and static simultaneously.  
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The aim for this chapter was to expand on the research questions by comparing the research 
data with the knowledge of other scholars. In this chapter I have showed that 1) there is an 
instrumental and dynamic usage of ethnic and religious identities in the case of Nigeria. 2) 
My research supports and refines the suggested perspective on the instrumental usage of 
ethnopolitics being a two-way usage. 3) My research further suggests an alternative or 
additional ethnopolitical perspective; that there is in addition to the before-mentioned 
instrumental usage a meta-instrumental usage of ethnicity in the political discourse. 4) 
Addresses the disagreement within the instrumentalist approach and between the 
instrumentalist and essentialist views on ethnicity and ethnic identity.  
 Attitudes towards ethnic identities and inclusion and exclusion are played out in the political 
discourse. In the political discourse this takes place as various actors make use of the so-
called “Rhetoric of Unity”. Antagonisms and other attitudes are “silently” expressed through 
this channel and this instrumental usage is what the literature address as ethnopolitics or 
political tribalism. Ethnopolitics is, however, not only used to manipulate the “dumb masses” 
as the “Rhetoric of Unity” is an available tool that various actors in the political discourse and 
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political arena in general may utilise for their own purposes. The instrumental usage does 
therefore not necessarily have to be negative as such, but a tool for expressing one's opinion, a 
democratic right. This right may however, be used to argue against the current democracy. It 
is this relativity which I see as the core of the Nigerian political discourse and its key elements 
of “democracy”, “development”, “justice”, “equality”, and last but not the least, “unity”. 
Ethnopolitics does also exist on a meta-level in which actors make use of the public's 
knowledge and perhaps even dislike of political actors' participation in ethnopolitics. On the 
meta-level actors make use of other actors’ implementation of key elements and mobilisation 
of identity along ethnic, regional, and religious affiliations.  
I have demonstrated that there is a tension not only within the instrumentalist approach, but 
also between the instrumentalist and the essentialist perspective in terms of ethnicity and 
ethnopolitics. The instrumentalist approach as well as the instrumental usage of the “Rhetoric 
of Unity” can be regarded both dynamic and static. That the dynamic usage is by both mass 
and elite for the sake of different interests and that the antagonisms are expressed through 
stereotyping of the “other” underlines this claim.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
7. Conclusion 
7.1 Summary 
“Nigerian Politics of Unity” is the title for this thesis as I claim that the “politics of unity” or 
in other words the “Rhetoric of Unity” can sustain and moreover exacerbate existing tensions. 
The aim of this thesis has been to expand on the dynamic of religion, politics, and identity, 
and furthermore how ideas of inclusion and exclusion are expressed. My motivation for 
posing the questions above was instigated by what I saw as inadequate accounts by previous 
research within the field of ethnicity in Nigeria. In chapter 2, I therefore gave an overview of 
previous research and critiques of the instrumentalist approach. I furthermore, pointed to how 
the contributions of this dissertation by adding that “ethnopolitics” and instrumentalism can 
be seen as both dynamic and static in the Nigerian case.  Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1990; Laclau 1993b) terminology of “floating signifiers”, I account for 
the choice of discourse analysis applied in ch.5. I established my own typology of Nigerian 
“positions” as depicted in the “mediascape” of the two newspapers. These positions include 
“Boko Haram”, “Extreme elements”, “Moderate elements”, and “Nigerian Leaders”. In 
chapter 5, I implemented discourse analysis on my material consisting of newspaper excerpts. 
In chapter 6 the findings of the discourse analysis are further discussed in relation to previous 
scholarly work outlined in ch.2. ’ As outlined in the introduction chapter, I have addressed 
how these concepts relate to one another by looking at how Nigerians and particularly 
Nigerian leaders, in their statements, use ethnic identity for their political agendas. 
 
 
7.2 Contributions 
The findings of this dissertation suggest that there is an instrumental usage of ethnic identity 
which does not create new, but strengthen existing antagonisms and divisions by referring to 
current dichotomies. The instrumental usage or the “ethnopolitics” is furthermore dynamic, 
meaning that it can be implemented in more than one way and by more than one group of 
actors (or positions). Analysing the data using discourse analysis, I argued for an 
interpretation of what was “hidden”. In other words, I analysed what was communicated 
between the lines or expressed through metaphors and metaphoric language. I found that the 
discourse was often used to express antagonisms. This happened when actors gave each other 
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different labels and thus categorized the other individual or group as the “other”. I will now 
move on to a more detailed account of my main findings and contributions to the wider 
academic field. 
 
 
7.2.1 Typology of “media positions” 
The data presented in ch.4 “Nigerian Positions” are depictions of Nigerians as presented by 
the media. My typology is thus a way of structuring what has already been published and 
interpreted by the media. However, by structuring it I am providing an independent analysis. 
The typology outlined in chapter 5 consists of the following positions: “Boko Haram”, 
“Extreme elements”, “moderate elements”, and “Nigerian leaders”. I found that presenting 
these positions in the Nigerian “mediascape” was useful to convey attitudes towards identity 
in my material. Among the three main positions (not Boko Haram) I found that there were 
extreme, moderate and democratic elements on both sides of the religious, ethnic, and 
regional divisions. The purpose of outlining the “media positions” was to illustrate the 
complex group formations in Nigeria, but also to offer an introduction to the material and 
moreover provide a background for the analysis in chapter 5.  
 
 
7.2.2 “Rhetoric of Unity” 
In ch.5, I made use of discourse analysis and find that in the political discourse there is a 
dominant “Rhetoric of Unity”. Unity can be seen as the overarching theme of the key 
elements of the rhetoric which are: “unity”, “development”, “democracy”, “justice”, and 
“equality”. The elements are however, somehow overlapping. Actors within the political 
discourse tend to refer to one or several of them and the elements constitute what Laclau and 
Moffe (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 34: 40; Laclau 1990; 1993b) has referred to as “floating 
signifiers”. In Part II, for instance, I illustrate that there is an alternative way, a way in which 
“Nigeria” and the “one Nigeria project” can be perceived as the enemy. Such elements are 
thus advocating for a different kind of unity than that of the “one Nigeria project” and of both 
Jonathan and Buhari. This underlines that the key elements are floating signifiers that can be 
used differently, by different actors, and for different purposes.  The instrumental usage of the 
key elements can further be harmful as it can sustain and even exacerbate existing tensions. 
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As I have demonstrated previously, the usage is, however, dynamic. It can therefore be used 
in more than one way, what is harmful to some is an expression of democracy to others. 
In Part I, I label the rhetoric of Jonathan for the “one Nigeria project” in which individuals 
reported to be protesting against the results, and other individuals and groups causing violence 
and destruction, are labelled “misguided” elements, and thus an enemy of Nigeria. In Part II, I 
illustrate that there is an alternative way, a way in which “Nigeria” and the “one Nigeria 
project” can be perceived as the enemy. Such elements are thus advocating for a different 
kind of unity than that of the “one Nigeria project” and of both Jonathan and Buhari. This 
underlines that the key elements are floating signifiers that can be used differently, by 
different actors, and for different purposes. The instrumental usage of the key elements can be 
harmful as it can sustain and even exacerbate existing tensions. As I have demonstrated 
previously, the usage is also dynamic and can therefore be used in more than one way. 
 
 
7.2.3 Critique of existing theory 
I mentioned initially that my motivation for posing the research questions I did is that I regard 
existing literature of not adequately addressing the topic of ethnicity in Nigeria. While 
exploring the literature I also found that while focusing on the political aspects of ethnicity 
there was a strong tendency of leaning toward an instrumentalist approach. The 
instrumentalist approach came to exist as a response to the essentialist approach implemented 
during the colonial era. The instrumentalist perspective emphasise ethnicity as constructed 
and dynamic unlike the static view of the “savages”. In the study of Nigeria, the 
instrumentalist approach has however been criticised of falling in the same pit as the previous 
essentialist approach. Critics claim that its scholars are offering a reductionist account by 
over-emphasising the top-down manipulation in which the “clever” elite is opposed to the 
‘dumb’ masses (Ukiwo 2005). I have confirmed that there exists an instrumental usage of 
ethnic identity in which the elite(s) use ethnic identity to manipulate the masses. However, I 
have also found that this usage is dynamic as the political discourse can be seen as a political 
arena in which various actors express their opinions and political agendas. The instrumental 
usage is also dynamic as it exists not only on a two-way level, but on a meta-level in which 
participation in ethnopolitics is used as a weapon against the opponent. By using it as a 
weapon the actor is taking part in ethnopolitics him- or herself, but on a meta-level. Though 
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the instrumentalist approach involves a scholarly view on ethnicity as constructed and 
dynamic, it is somehow in conflict with itself as the usage in the case of Nigeria takes an 
essentialist form through stereotyping. Said’s concept of the “other” entails a static depiction 
of the other as something negative whereas the subject viewing the object are attributed all the 
positive properties. The “other” is thus static, it can be the “North”, “youth”, “politicians”, but 
is always associated with something negative  It is however, dynamic as well given that the 
contents of the category the “other” might change just as identity formations are fluid and 
dynamic.  
 
 
7.3 Final words 
Due to limited time and space, the study presented here does not investigate if, or how, the 
usage of this rhetoric might increase intra-ethnic tension. Moreover, it does not, in my view, 
adequately account for the role of sub-national politics in relation to the federal in terms of the 
“Rhetoric of Unity”.  As for methods, I can only say that discourse analysis was a magnificent 
tool in order to “uncover” messages between the lines and to bring out messages wrapped in 
imagery language and cartoons. The weakness of this study is that though I have 
demonstrated that the rhetoric can be used by various actors across social strata, I do not, 
unfortunately, encompass all voices. For further research I would therefore have preferred to 
combine the methods of this study with interviews or ethnography as to find out more from 
those Nigerians whose voices are not “audible” or visible in my current material. I would also 
suggest a more in-depth study of the dynamic of sub-national and national politics in terms of 
“unity” rhetoric.  Given that this is a Master’s thesis and thus a smaller dissertation, the 
limitations made were necessary in order to complete study and hence offer a contribution to 
the wider academic field.  
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